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FACULTY OF LETTERS AND LANGUAGES

DOMAIN: FOREIGN LANGUAGES

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH

STREAM: ENGLISH LANGUAGE

N:.....

OPTION: LITERATURE AND CIVILIZATION

**The Systematic Demonization of the Palestinian Resistance and  
its Impact on the Libertarian Course of  
the Palestinian Cause**

**A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for a Master's Degree in Literature and Civilization**

**Submitted by:**

**Supervised by:**

**1 - Boudjema HAMAD**

**Dr. Mohammed Gouffi**

**2- Mohammed BEACEL**

**Academic Year: 2023/2024**

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*Dedication*

*Dedicated to wounded Gaza*

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
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# General Introduction

### General Introduction

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been one of the most protracted and complex conflicts in modern history. Central to this conflict is the Palestinian resistance movement, which has faced extensive demonization and negative portrayal in various forms of media, international discourse, and political rhetoric. This research proposal seeks to investigate the systematic demonization of the Palestinian resistance and assess its impact on the trajectory of the Palestinian cause, specifically in the context of libertarian aspirations.

The Palestinian resistance is a multifaceted movement, encompassing various groups and tactics, including political organizations, armed factions, and nonviolent activists. The systematic demonization of the Palestinian resistance by governments, media outlets, and international bodies has far-reaching implications for the Palestinian cause. It shapes global perceptions of the conflict and influences policy decisions, often hindering the realization of Palestinian rights and aspirations for self-determination.

The significance of this research lies in its potential to shed light on the ways in which demonization affects the Palestinian resistance, the international community's responses to the conflict, and the overall pursuit of libertarian goals for the Palestinian people.

There is no doubt that what Israel has been doing recently (especially since October 7, 2023) demonstrates to world public opinion as a whole that the issue of

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Israel's occupation of Palestine and what it is practicing on the Palestinian people, such as killing, destruction, siege, and so on, is not an issue of borders, but rather an issue of existence (existential issue). Also, the demonization of the resistance through Israel's behavior towards the defenseless Palestinian people revealed the truth of this demonization, whether from Israel or from Western countries such as the United States of America, France, Britain, and others.

Regarding **the scope of the study**, this involves exploring various dimensions related to the portrayal, perception, and consequences of the Palestinian resistance in different contexts. Here are some aspects that can be considered in this study, explore the roots of the conflict and the development of the Palestinian cause over time and analyze how the Palestinian resistance is portrayed in mainstream media, both regionally and internationally, and explore the impact of geopolitical interests on the framing of the Palestinian cause.

In this context as well, assess the human rights implications of the demonization of the Palestinian resistance and explore how the portrayal of the Palestinian resistance affects diplomatic relations and alliances.

***The motivation*** to study this topic stems from several factors, including historical, political, and humanitarian concerns. Key reasons include: understanding propaganda and perception management by analyzing how the Palestinian resistance movements are portrayed in the media, both regionally and internationally, which helps uncover the strategies employed in shaping public opinion; investigating the impact on global perspectives, shedding light on how global perspectives are influenced by media portrayals, and how these portrayals

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can impact the international community's understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; examining human rights and justice, assessing the fairness and accuracy of narratives, especially regarding human rights violations that may be downplayed or overlooked; understanding political implications, as the demonization of the Palestinian resistance can affect diplomatic efforts, international relations, and policy decisions, which is crucial for policymakers, activists, and scholars; analyzing the impact on the peace process, as the portrayal of the Palestinian resistance can influence the prospects for peace in the region, identifying obstacles and potential solutions; and achieving a nuanced understanding of the conflict, It is vital to strengthen the Palestinian presence in the land of Palestine and find sustainable solutions that respect the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to live in their land in all freedom and stability and without clear global injustice.

The primary *objectives* of this research are to analyze the historical context and evolution of the Palestinian resistance movement, to investigate the systematic demonization of the Palestinian resistance in various forms of media, international discourse, and political rhetoric, to assess the impact of demonization on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Palestinian resistance, and to examine the relationship between demonization and the prospects of achieving libertarian goals for the Palestinian people.

This study aims to answer the following *research questions*:

- a. How has the Palestinian resistance evolved over time, and what are its key components and strategies?

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- b.** In what ways is the Palestinian resistance systematically demonized in media, international discourse, and political rhetoric?
- c.** What are the consequences of demonization for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Palestinian resistance?
- d.** How does the systematic demonization of the Palestinian resistance affect the pursuit of libertarian goals for the Palestinian people?

To address the research objectives and questions, a mixed-methods approach will be used. So we will employ the descriptive approach that "provides a detailed and accurate picture of the characteristics and behaviors of a particular population or subject. By observing and collecting data on a given topic, descriptive research helps researchers gain a deeper understanding of a specific issue and provide valuable insights that can inform future studies" (**Sirisilla**).

We also used the **media influence approach**, which is critical scholars argue that dominant media messages presented through the mass media influence the beliefs and values held by viewers, the findings from empirical studies notwithstanding. In fact, critical scholars argue that the effects of dominant media messages often are so pervasive that hegemonic consistent messages usually are accepted, and perpetuated, as "common sense". (**Goidel ,p.287-318**).

So, the influences of the media, whether the Arab media or the Western media increased the demonization of the Palestinian resistance and played an important role in distorting the legitimacy of the resistance and its just and true goals. In another meaning the era of media globalization has revealed that the media has a major role in spreading rumors and misleading people about what is happening in the countries of the world, especially in the land of Palestine and the work of the Palestinian resistance that defends the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause over a long period.

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In addition to what was mentioned, we used a comprehensive literature review of existing academic, policy, and media literature related to the Palestinian resistance and its demonization; content analysis of media content, political speeches, and international statements to identify patterns and trends in the demonization of the Palestinian resistance; and in-depth case studies examining specific instances of demonization and its impact on the Palestinian resistance.

This research was designed according to the following plan, where after the introduction in the first chapter we will focus on the Palestinian resistance, where a general history of both the issue and the Palestinian resistance is presented and an analysis of the most important events and movements that embody the action of the Palestinian resistance, the most important of which are the Fatah and Hamas movements.

As for the second chapter, we will devote it to analyzing the demonization process by discovering how the Palestinian resistance is systematically demonized at the international, regional, and internal levels. In addition to studying the role of Western and Arab media regarding what is happening in the reality of the Palestinian issue and the work of the resistance on the ground.

The research concludes with a conclusion in which we summarize the results of the research and give a vision for the future of the Palestinian issue.

At the end of this general introduction, we faced some *difficulties* in completing this research, including the short time, the impact of special working conditions, and the lack of references related to the phenomenon of demonization of the Palestinian resistance (PR).

# *Chapter one:*

## *Introduction to the Palestinian issue and resistance*

### 1.1. Introduction to the Palestinian issue

The question of Palestine is known in Middle Eastern political discourse as the “hard number.” There was no other issue that consumed the energies and resources of the international community more in the twentieth century than the issue of Palestine. Since 1948, it has been a cause of regional wars, and to this day it continues to pose a serious threat to international peace and security.

Despite its deep roots in history, many people know very little about it. While some realize that Zionist Israel was based on false historical claims, many people still do not know the origins and nature of these claims, and therefore we will talk briefly about the history of The Palestinian issue, starting from the British Mandate until the year of the Nakba and the establishment of the Israeli entity on the occupied Palestinian territories. (Daud .p ii)

#### 1.1.1. The Land of Palestine

The term “Palestine” refers to the area located in the southwest of Bilad al-Sham (i.e, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon) and it lies on the Mediterranean in the western part of Asia. It is considered the meeting point of Asia and Africa and is characterized by its proximity to Europe. It is bound to the north by Lebanon, to the northeast by Syria, to the east by Jordan, and to the south and southwest by Egypt. Palestine enjoys a moderate climate (the Mediterranean climate). The current geographic boundaries of Palestine were set accurately during the time of British occupation of Palestine, especially during the period 1920–1923. The total surface area of Palestine is 27,009 km<sup>2</sup>.

Throughout history, the boundaries of Palestine have expanded and narrowed. However, it generally represented the area between the Mediterranean Sea to the west and the Dead Sea and Jordan River to the east. Whatever the divisions in the various Islamic eras were, Palestine remained part of Bilad al-Sham. These divisions, whether expanded or narrowed, were never able to change the true feelings of its people that they belong to one Islamic nation and their loyalty to the rule would not be shaken so long as it was an Islamic rule.

The oldest known name of this land is “the land of Canaan”; while the name Palestine was derived from the name of naval peoples, who probably came from the west of Asia Minor and the Aegean Sea regions in the twelfth century BC. Its name was mentioned in old Egyptian inscriptions, and was referred to as

P.L.S.T. The N was added later possibly to pluralize the noun. These peoples lived in the coastal areas between Jaffa and Gaza, and settled in the cities of Gaza, 'Asqalan, Acre, Jet and Ashdod and they founded the city of Lod. They also mixed quickly with the Canaanites and left no distinctive trace except giving the land their name. (Mohsen .p8-9)

### 1.1.2. The People of Palestine

Artifacts unearthed in Palestine trace its human habitation back to the Early Stone Age (500 thousand–14 thousand BC). Evidence from the Middle Stone Age (14 thousand–8 thousand BC) points to the emergence of rudimentary forms of civilization, exemplified by the Natufian Civilization discovered in Shaqba northwest of Ramallah. Around 9,000 BC, a pivotal shift from nomadic herding to settled agriculture marked the initial stages of human development in the region. Jericho, founded in 8,000 BC in northeast Palestine, stands as the world's earliest known city, as per archaeological findings.

With the migration of the Canaanites from the Arabian Peninsula around 2,500 BC, Palestine experienced a significant demographic transformation. The Canaanites, who swiftly became the predominant populace, constructed over 200 urban and rural settlements, including notable cities like Bisan, 'Asqalan, Acre, Haifa, Hebron, Ashdod, Beersheba, and Bethlehem, many of which endure today. Scholars widely assert that the contemporary Palestinian population, particularly the rural communities, are descendants of Canaanite, Amorite, and Palestinian tribes, as well as Arabian tribes that settled in the region before and after the Islamic conquest, amalgamating into a diverse cultural mosaic.

The majority of Palestinians embraced Islam, and their linguistic and cultural identity became Arabized with the rise of Islam. Throughout history, Palestine maintained its Islamic character, from the early Islamic conquests in 15 AH/636 CE to the present day. Despite the enduring Islamic heritage, the forced displacement of segments of the Palestinian population by Israeli occupation since 1948 remains a significant challenge (Mohsen .p 10-11)

### 1.1.3. British Occupation of Palestine

Britain embraced the Zionist agenda with the issuance of the Balfour Declaration on November 2, 1917, pledging to establish a national homeland for Jews in Palestine. By September 1918, Britain had completed its occupation of

Palestine, disregarding the promises of autonomy made to the Arab population, led by Sharif Hussein at the time. Additionally, the Sykes–Picot agreements of May 1916 divided Bilad al-Sham and Iraq into French and British spheres of influence, with intentions to designate Palestine as an international zone.

Subsequently, through the San Remo Agreement of April 1920, Britain assumed control over Palestine, incorporating the full text of the Balfour Declaration into the mandate charter approved by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922. However, the core principle of the mandate, crafted by the League of Nations, was to assist the mandated people in preparing for independence. This mandate charter entrusted Britain with the responsibility of fostering local governance structures and safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all Palestinian inhabitants. Thus, theoretically, the Balfour Declaration was not intended to impede Palestinians from establishing their institutions and state.

In practice, the implementation of the Balfour Declaration marginalized the interests and rights of Palestinians, hindering the development of their constitutional institutions towards statehood. Britain consistently prioritized the aspects related to the Balfour Declaration while neglecting the rights of Palestinian Arabs.

In 1918, Palestine's population totaled approximately 665 thousand, with Arabs comprising the majority at around 610 thousand (91.7%), including 550 thousand Muslims and 60 thousand Christians. Conversely, Jews numbered around 55 thousand (8.3%), mostly foreign immigrants from Russia and Eastern Europe over the preceding four decades. Under British rule, which pledged support for a Jewish national home, Palestine saw a surge in Jewish immigration and settlement. Consequently, between 1919 and 1948, 483 thousand Jews immigrated to Palestine, marking a thirteen-fold increase from 55 thousand to 650 thousand. Thus, the substantial rise in the Jewish population was primarily due to immigration rather than natural growth, while the Arab population increased naturally, reaching one million forty thousand by 1948. This demographic composition meant that Arabs constituted 68.3% of Palestine's population, with Jewish immigrants comprising 31.7%, maintaining Arab majority even at the time of Israel's establishment. (Mohsen .p 17-18)

### 1.1.4. - The Partition Resolution and Palestine's War of 1948

#### 1.1.4.1. The Partition Resolution

The UN Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, marked a pivotal moment in the history of Palestine, yet its process and outcome were marred by controversy and coercion. Initially, the proposal faced uncertainty due to a lack of necessary votes. However, under intense pressure and dubious tactics, including bribery and manipulation, the resolution eventually passed, leading to the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states.

The resolution allocated disproportionate land shares, with 54.7% assigned to the proposed Jewish state, 44.8% to the Arab state, and a minute fraction to the Jerusalem area. This distribution, lacking consultation with the Palestinian population and ignoring fundamental principles of self-determination, legality, and fairness, stirred immediate objections.

Critics argued that the resolution contravened the UN's purpose by disregarding the Palestinians' right to self-determination and by intervening in a mandate region without proper authority. Furthermore, it failed to consider the existing land ownership and population ratios, allocating a majority of territory to a minority group.

The proposed Jewish state, home to a slightly larger Jewish population than Palestinians, faced inherent demographic challenges that undermined its viability as a purely Jewish entity. Conversely, the proposed Arab state enjoyed a significant numerical advantage, raising concerns among Zionist leaders about the demographic balance.

In response to the perceived threat to their homeland and rights, Palestinians mobilized resistance efforts. The passage of the partition resolution fueled their determination to oppose dispossession and fight for their homeland's sovereignty. This resistance culminated in armed conflict as Palestinians confronted Zionist forces supported by British and Western backing.

Ultimately, the partition resolution, while legally non-binding and ethically questionable, laid the groundwork for a protracted conflict that continues to shape the region's geopolitics and the Palestinian struggle for justice and self-determination. (Mohsen .p 28-31)

#### 1.1.4.2. Palestine's War of 1948

In September and October 1947, during the Sofar and Aley conferences, Arab nations resolved to resist the decisions of the International Committee,

provide military support to Palestinians, and organize military efforts. The 1948 Palestine war erupted following the UN resolution on partitioning Palestine. Initially, Palestinians bore the brunt of the conflict with limited volunteer support, as Arab countries withheld military intervention until the end of the British Mandate on May 15, 1948.

Simultaneously, Palestinians established the Al-Jihad al-Muqaddas organization under 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, while the Arab League formed the "Arab Salvation Army" comprising volunteers from Arab and Islamic nations. Despite meager military assistance, Palestinians managed to unsettle Jewish forces, prompting the US to reconsider its support for the partition plan.

By the time Arab armies entered the fray, Palestinians had retained 80% of their land despite facing severe weapon shortages compared to the Jews. However, the disparity in troop numbers and capabilities became evident, with Arab forces struggling due to unfamiliar terrain, poor organization, and inadequate supplies.

On May 14, 1948, the Zionists declared the establishment of Israel, capitalizing on the weak leadership and inexperience of Arab forces, some of which remained under colonial influence. Israel's victory resulted in the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes and the destruction of numerous villages.

Following the war, Jordan annexed the West Bank, and Egypt administered the Gaza Strip. The UN admitted Israel as a member on the condition of allowing Palestinian refugees to return, a condition never fulfilled. The conflict inflicted profound social and economic upheaval on the Palestinian people, displacing them from their ancestral land.

Efforts by the Arab Higher Executive to establish a Palestinian government were thwarted by Egyptian intervention, leading to the displacement of al-Husseini and the government's officials. Despite this setback, the All-Palestine Government declared independence and sought international recognition, illustrating Palestinians' determination to assert their sovereignty amidst adversity (Mohsen .p 32-35)

### 1.2: The Zionist movement and the Palestinian issue

#### 1.2.1. The Jews' Alleged Historical Claims to Palestine

The purported historical claims of Jews to Palestine crumble in light of the established rights of Arab Muslims to their ancestral land. Palestine was

inhabited and governed by its native people for approximately 1,500 years prior to the establishment of the Israelite state, the Kingdom of David. Even during the Israelite era, wherein they held partial control over certain regions of Palestine for around four centuries (1000–586 BC), the indigenous population remained rooted in their homeland, enduring successive ruling powers such as the Assyrians, Persians, Pharaohs, Greeks, and Romans.

The Islamic epoch stands as the longest in Palestinian history, spanning roughly 1,200 years from 636 to 1917, with an interruption during the Crusader period lasting 90 years. Conversely, for nearly 1,800 years—from 135 CE to the 20th century—Jews lacked significant influence in Palestine, as their religious doctrines forbade a return to the region. Furthermore, studies conducted by Jewish scholars, including Arthur Koestler, reveal that over 80% of contemporary Jews, predominantly the Ashkenazi branch originating from Khazar Jews of ancient Tartar-Turkish descent in the northern Caucasus, lack ancestral ties to Palestine.

Hence, if a "right of return" exists for Jews, it could be argued that it pertains to southern Russia rather than Palestine. This assertion gains credence considering historical events, such as the majority of the children of Israel declining Moses' call to journey to the holy land, and their reluctance to return from Babylon when permitted by the Persian Emperor Cyrus. Moreover, throughout history, the Jewish population in Palestine has rarely exceeded 40% of global Jewry, except for recent years since approximately 2007 (Mohsen .p 12-13).

### 1.2.2. The Emergence of the Zionist Project

Napoleon Bonaparte's military campaigns in Egypt and Palestine, swiftly conquering Egypt in July 1798 and subsequently venturing into Palestine in 1799, spotlighted the Ottoman State's vulnerabilities and stirred European Colonialism's appetite for involvement in the region's division. Despite the failure of Bonaparte's campaign, particularly evident in the unsuccessful siege of Acre in 1799, it nonetheless paved the way for increased European engagement in Palestine.

Calls from both Jewish and non-Jewish Zionists urging a return to Palestine gained momentum towards the late 19th century. However, Jewish interest in the region primarily stemmed from traditional religious ties to holy sites and charitable settlement endeavors, lacking a cohesive political agenda. The Jewish

population in Palestine remained modest, numbering approximately 5,000 in 1799 and reaching just 13,920 by 1876.

Beginning in 1882, Jewish immigration to Palestine took on a more organized and substantial character, spurred by the "Jewish Question" in Russia. The Ottoman State implemented various measures to hinder Jewish settlement, including the 1887 separation of the Jerusalem district from the Vilayet of Syria, placing it directly under central government supervision.

Despite the significant emigration of Jews, particularly from Russia and Eastern Europe, totaling 2,367,000 individuals between 1881 and 1914, only a fraction, approximately 55,000 (2.32% of the total), migrated to Palestine. The majority opted for destinations such as the United States, Western Europe, and South America. This underscores both the Ottoman authorities' relative success in restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine and the prevailing lack of interest in the region among Jews during the 19th century (Mohsen .p 13-17).

### 1.2.3. The reasons for the emergence of the Zionist movement

The emergence of the Zionist movement, aiming to establish a Jewish presence in Palestine, can be traced back to several factors. Firstly, in the 16th century, Zionist inclinations arose among European Christians, particularly Protestants, some of whom advocated for the resettlement of Jews in Palestine. Additionally, the failure of the "Jewish Enlightenment" movement, or "Haskalah," which aimed to integrate Jews into their surrounding communities, contributed to the rise of Zionist sentiment.

Nationalist ideologies, spurred by the emergence of nation-states in 19th-century Europe, also played a significant role. Many Jews yearned for a land where they could govern themselves and live with a distinct Jewish nationality. The "Jewish question," particularly pronounced in Eastern Europe, and Russian persecution further fueled the desire for a Jewish homeland.

Jews with influence in European and American circles leveraged their positions to advance Zionist objectives. Some Western countries, wary of absorbing waves of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, supported the idea of diverting them to Palestine.

The establishment of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and its inaugural conference in Basel in 1897, led by Theodor Herzl, marked the formal beginning of organized efforts to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. However, the Zionist Movement has been criticized as inherently racist, rooted in Jewish

religious and national texts, and reliant on the displacement of Palestinian Arabs.

Herzl sought to achieve Zionist goals through diplomatic channels, attempting to persuade major powers like Britain to support the project. Despite his efforts, Sultan Abdul Hamid II of the Ottoman Empire resisted Zionist pressures.

On a global scale, the Zionist movement faced significant challenges and achieved little until the end of World War I.

Palestinians actively opposed the Zionist project from its inception. The first clashes between Palestinian farmers and Zionist settlers occurred in 1886, prompting Palestinians to petition Ottoman authorities. Palestinian newspapers, such as al-Karmel and Palestine, played a crucial role in exposing the perceived threat posed by Zionism. (Mohsen .p 13-17)

### **1.2.4. The nature of the Zionist project:**

The Zionist project is an aggressive, expansionist, settler-colonial project of population replacement. It is not only hostile to the Palestinian people but also to humanity and its values and to the Ummah, especially the Arab-Muslim environment surrounding it. The Zionist project was implanted in the heart of the region. It is allied with the Western colonial powers having mutual objectives. The establishment of Israel to fulfill the role of being a “buffer state” and a colonial stronghold, supported by western colonialism, especially the British, represents the pinnacle of the western-Zionist threat. By establishing it in the heart of the Muslim and Arab lands, it would split the two wings of the Muslim world in Asia and Africa into two separate parts. It would obstruct Muslim unity and thereby weaken it. Hence, this would ensure that the Arab and Muslim world remains divided and incapable of any revival, rotating instead in the orbit of subservience, producing raw materials and consuming western commodities. It also aims to prevent the emergence of a major Muslim power, to replace the Ottoman State, which was in the process of collapse. The chances of Israel continuing to enjoy stability and growth in a hostile environment rest upon an assurance that the Muslim states around it remain weak, fragmented and underdeveloped. Likewise, the likelihood of the revival of the Muslim Ummah, its unity, and its strength is dependent upon its ability to end the Zionist occupation of Palestine. (Saleh, Insights on the Road to Jerusalemr .p 7)

### **1.3. Introduction to the Palestinian resistance**

Palestinian resistance is the efforts made by the Palestinian people and various Palestinian groups and organizations to confront the Israeli occupation and confront its oppressive policies and actions. The forms of Palestinian resistance vary between armed resistance, popular, cultural, political and economic resistance.

The Palestinian resistance embodies the will of the Palestinian people to defend their legitimate rights, including the right of return for Palestinian refugees, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state on the land of Palestine, and an end to the Israeli occupation and the injustices to which the Palestinian people are exposed.

Historically, the Palestinian resistance began during the era of the British Mandate over Palestine in the twentieth century. It has continued through many stages and periods until now.

#### **1.3.1 The Emergence of the Palestinian National Movement**

After World War I, Palestinians found themselves in a weakened state, with Arab nations and the broader Muslim world subject to colonization. Their limited resources and lack of influence contrasted starkly with the robust support enjoyed by the Zionist project from global Jewry and major powers. Despite this disparity, Palestinians staunchly asserted their right to Palestine and insisted on independence at any cost.

During the British mandate, Palestinian political activism revolved around several key demands. These included nullifying the Balfour Declaration, which unjustly favored a minority at the expense of the majority population, halting Jewish immigration, prohibiting land sales to Jews, and establishing a representative Palestinian government. The Palestinian National Movement emerged from these principles, leading to the convening of the First Palestinian Arab Congress in Jerusalem in January-February 1919. Musa Kazim al-Husseini initially spearheaded the movement until his passing in March 1934, after which Haj Amin al-Husseini assumed leadership.

Between 1918 and 1928, three uprisings reflected widespread Palestinian opposition to the Zionist project. Although directed primarily against Jews, Palestinians sought to avoid direct confrontation with the British, who ultimately

suppressed these revolts. Notably, the Al-Buraq revolution of 1929 marked the start of a decade of intensified resistance against both Zionism and British colonialism.

The peak of resistance occurred during the Great Palestinian Revolution from 1936 to 1939, fueled by escalating Jewish immigration and land seizures. Despite British attempts to quell the uprising, including proposing the Peel Commission's partition plan, Palestinians persisted. In response, Britain issued the White Paper in 1939, renouncing the goal of a Jewish state and promising Palestinian self-governance within ten years, with limited Jewish immigration.

During World War II, the Zionist movement leveraged Jewish suffering to garner sympathy and support, particularly from the United States. President Truman's advocacy for Jewish immigration to Palestine further emboldened the Zionist cause. Meanwhile, Jewish military units in the British army, like the Haganah, laid the groundwork for Israel's future military strength. Jewish immigration surged, leading to land acquisitions and colony establishment.

Amidst mounting pressure from the US and a weakened Arab stance, Britain abolished the White Paper in 1945, initiating an Anglo-American inquiry into Palestine. Subsequent recommendations included admitting 100 thousand Jewish immigrants and facilitating land transfers to Jews, reflecting the increasing influence of Zionist interests on British policy. (Mohsen 21-27)

### **1.3.2. The Birth of the Fatah Movement and its Establishment**

#### **1.3.2.1. The Birth of the Fatah Movement**

In that era, the persecution faced by the Islamist movement, particularly in Egypt and the Gaza Strip, prompted young and eager Palestinian members of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Movement to contemplate strategies for liberating Palestine. While the prevailing sentiment urged patience and focus on educational and religious pursuits, a new inclination emerged towards establishing an organized armed resistance. This movement avoided overtly Islamic forms, opting instead for a nationalist framework to garner support from a broader base of youth and shield itself from persecution by anti-Islamist regimes. The Algerian revolution served as a primary inspiration for this initiative. Thus, the seeds of the Fatah Movement (also known as the Liberation of Palestine Movement and later the Palestinian National Liberation Movement) were sown in 1957 in Kuwait under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, drawing primarily from the ranks of the MB Movement, particularly from the Gaza Strip.

Khalil al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad, who would become the second-in-command in Fatah for over three decades until his assassination in April 1988, proposed the creation of such a movement to the leadership of the MB in the Gaza Strip, but received no response. Nevertheless, several esteemed members of the MB chose to join Fatah upon its inception, becoming key figures within its ranks. However, after initially focusing on recruiting members from the MB Movement until 1963, Fatah broadened its appeal to include other currents and segments, especially after the leadership of the Brotherhood in Gaza issued orders forcing members to choose between Fatah and the MB Movement.

Fatah adopted a nationalist, secular stance that continues to define its identity today. The movement established its military wing, known as al-'Asifah (The Storm), and conducted its first military operation in early 1965. Over the following years leading up to the June 1967 war, Fatah carried out approximately 200 military operations.

Meanwhile, the Arab Nationalist Movement, whose founding members were predominantly Palestinians who studied at the American University of Beirut in the mid-1950s, including George Habash, advocated for nationalist unity and the liberation of Palestine. Supporting Nasserist policies, it established the Palestine Committee in 1958. Following the failure of the Egyptian-Syrian union, the movement embraced socialist ideology and activism. In May 1964, the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine was founded, along with its military wing, "Shabab al-Tha'r" (Youth of Revenge), which initiated resistance operations in November 1964. By 1966, it had adopted Marxist ideology, and in December 1967, it collaborated with other factions to establish the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). (Mohammad .p 83-85)

### 1.3.2.2. The Establishment of the PLO

As Arab regimes became aware of the various covert activities and movements shaping the Palestinian landscape, Nasser sought to maintain control, especially amidst the discord among Arab nations. This led to a push for the inclusion of Palestinians within a recognized and manageable official entity. In 1959, the Arab League made a decision to reorganize the Palestinian people and unite them under representatives chosen by the populace. However, this initiative faced delays until the death of Ahmad Hilmi 'Abdulbaqi, the delegate of the All-Palestine government at the Arab League in 1963.

With Nasser's backing, Ahmad al-Shuqairi was appointed to replace 'Abdulbaqi and tasked with examining the Palestine issue and devising

strategies to invigorate it. At the First Arab Summit in Cairo on January 13, 1964, al-Shuqairi was assigned to engage with member states and the Palestinian people to establish a framework for organizing Palestinians and empowering them to play a role in liberating their homeland and shaping their destiny. However, al-Shuqairi, convinced that any proposed measures would face further delays, chose to confront the Arab League with a fait accompli by establishing, with Egypt's support, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The inaugural Palestinian national conference convened in Jerusalem on May 28, 1964, with 422 representatives from Palestine in attendance, under the patronage of King Hussein bin Talal of Jordan. The official announcement of the PLO's formation was made, and the Palestine National Charter, affirming armed struggle for the liberation of all of Palestine and rejecting the surrender of any part of it, was ratified. Ahmad al-Shuqairi was elected as the president of the PLO, which resolved to establish the Palestinian Liberation Army and implement tactical and public relations measures. Generally, Palestinians welcomed the establishment of the PLO as it symbolized the Palestinian entity and national identity that had previously been lacking. However, some factions, harbored doubts about its founding principles and its efficacy in fulfilling its objectives (Mohammad .p 86)

### 1.3.3. The Armed Palestinian Struggle

Between 1967 and 1970, a significant surge in armed Palestinian resistance marked a pivotal era, particularly evident in the opening of borders between Palestine and Jordan (360 km) and Lebanon (79 km). Notably, the Battle of Karamah on 21/3/1968 showcased a remarkable display of Palestinian resistance against Israeli forces, resulting in substantial losses for the latter and a morale boost for the former. This period witnessed a surge in volunteerism, with tens of thousands joining the resistance, escalating armed actions from 12 operations per month in 1967 to 279 per month by early 1970.

However, internal conflicts with the Jordanian army in September 1970 and July 1971 led to the expulsion of Palestinian resistance from Jordan, a significant setback. Despite this, the resistance managed to fortify its presence in Lebanon, albeit facing opposition from the Lebanese army. The Cairo Agreement of November 1969 provided some respite, allowing armed operations through Lebanon, but the onset of the Lebanese civil war further complicated matters,

with the Palestinian presence targeted by various factions, notably the Kataeb-Maronite alliance.

The resistance also faced challenges from former allies like the Shiite Amal Movement, leading to prolonged sieges of Palestinian camps (1985–1987). Additionally, border closures by Egypt and Syria hindered cross-border operations, while Israel responded ruthlessly, targeting civilian areas and infrastructure in Jordan and Lebanon, including factories, bridges, and power plants.

In Lebanon, Israel launched intensive campaigns and assassinated PLO leaders, further escalating tensions. The Battle of Beaufort in 19/8/1980 marked a significant success for the Palestinian resistance against overwhelming odds. Yet, Israeli retaliations, such as bombings in the al-Nabatiyeh region, claimed numerous lives.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982 marked a turning point, resulting in significant casualties. Despite fierce resistance in Beirut, a ceasefire agreement forced the exit of Palestinian fighters from Lebanon, scattering them across several countries. Israel, however, violated the ceasefire, leading to the infamous Sabra and Shatila massacre. Though the resistance displayed valor, the 1982 war decimated much of its infrastructure, diminishing its threat to Israel.

Consequently, external operations dwindled in the 1970s and 1980s, though notable attacks occurred, such as the Savoy Hotel Attack and various hijackings. Political fatigue led to a shift towards peaceful solutions, with the PLO altering its discourse and embracing political action, culminating in compromises like the Fez Arab Project for Peace in 1982. However, this period also witnessed a decline in political influence and effectiveness for the PLO, reflecting broader challenges within Arab circles. (Mohammad 100-111)

### 1.3.4. The PLO: From Armed Struggle to Peaceful Settlement

The PLO suffered from political weakness after the successive attempts to undermine it militarily, and was greatly marginalized in the October 1987 Arab summit in Amman. It considered the Intifadah a political boost, and tried to exploit it early on. The PLO formed the Unified National Command of the Intifadah one month after the Intifadah began, in which it actively took part alongside the Palestinian factions, especially Fatah. On 16/4/1988, Israel retaliated by assassinating Abu Jihad (the second-in-command in the PLO and Fatah) in Tunisia, as part of its fierce campaign to quash the Intifadah. When

Jordan severed its administrative and legal links with the WB on 31/7/1988, the PLO reaffirmed its sole representation of the WB inhabitants and launched what it dubbed “the Palestinian peace attack.” During the PLO’s 19th Palestinian National Council (12–15/11/1988), a Palestinian program was established based on the recognition of the UNGA Resolution 181 of 1947, which partitioned Palestine into two states, Arab and Jewish. The PLO recognized for the first time UN Security Council Resolution 242 that was issued in November 1967, and called for a political settlement through an international conference. In order to help the Palestinians swallow all these bitter pills, the conference announced “the establishment of the State of Palestine.”<sup>7</sup> This announcement was internationally acclaimed, and more than 100 countries recognized the state within a few months. Although the US and the western European countries did not recognize it, and it remained more of a hope than a reality, the announcement highlighted again the Palestine issue on the international arena and restored the PLO’s political presence, after it had accepted dwarfing its demands and reduced its attempts to struggle against occupation.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, significant shifts occurred in both Arab and international spheres, profoundly impacting Palestinian and Arab positions. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 exacerbated tensions among Arab nations, leading to resource depletion, destruction of Iraqi military infrastructure, and the displacement of Palestinians from Kuwait. This event also led to a withdrawal of support for the PLO. Meanwhile, on the international stage, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist Eastern bloc altered global dynamics. Former rivals embraced Western capitalism and democracy, seeking economic assistance and shifting the political balance. Consequently, the United States emerged as the dominant global power, particularly evident after the Gulf War in 1991. The growing influence of Jewish Zionism within the US administration, exemplified by key appointments in the Clinton administration, further complicated matters for Palestinians.

The US sought to impose its hegemony, and vision of a new world order, including pushing to close the Palestinian file in order to serve Israel, its strategic ally. While the Palestinians paid a hefty price for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist states, these countries restored their diplomatic ties with Israel, and opened up the doors of Jewish immigration to Palestine, especially from the Soviet Union. Indeed, on 7/5/2000 Israel celebrated the arrival of the millionth immigrant from the Soviet Union since September 1989,

welcomed by the prime minister himself.<sup>8</sup> This wave of immigrants included around 92 thousand scientists,<sup>9</sup> among whom were several thousand specialized in the nuclear industry, not to mention the advanced military competences, which increased the danger of Israel and its nuclear project in the region. It is amid such advantageous circumstances for the US and Israel that the US succeeded in dragging the Arab states to the Arab-Israeli Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991, which was followed by direct Arab-Israeli negotiations. Around two years of negotiations between the two did not break Israeli intransigence. The announcement of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo Accords) between both sides came as a surprise, as it was disclosed that secret negotiations had been taking place between the two sides since 20/1/1993, unbeknown to the official negotiating Palestinian delegation (headed by Haidar 'Abdul Shafi) and most of the PLO officials. The Accords were initially signed in Oslo, Norway, on 19/8/1993, before being signed officially on 13/9/1993 in Washington.

It was sponsored by US President Bill Clinton, and took place in the presence of Yasir 'Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The Accords were signed by Mahmud 'Abbas for the Palestinian side and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres for the Israeli side, in addition to the US and Russian foreign ministers acting as witnesses. The multi-phased Oslo Accords,<sup>10</sup> which constituted the basis for the PA, stipulated self-governance in the GS and Jericho first, then in broader Palestinian areas (especially inhabited ones) in later stages. **(Mohammad 115-121)**

It stated that authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. Negotiations were supposed to take place on sensitive issues and the final status two years after self-governance. However, the Israelis kept stalling and delaying, while granting the powers to the Palestinians encountered many complications that usually revolved around demanding the PA to succeed in the Israeli "test" of striking a blow to Hamas and the resistance movements, and to offer even more concessions. Many detailed agreements then followed, such as the Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area on 4/5/1994, the Oslo II Accords (Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) also known as Taba Agreement on 28/9/1995, the Wye River Plantation Memorandum on 23/10/1998, and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on 4/9/1999. The self-governance regions were divided into A and B. Until

2000, the PA only controlled 18% of the WB under Article A pertaining to its security and administrative control, and around 22% of the WB under Article B pertaining to its administrative control, while the security control was administered jointly with the Israelis. (Mohammad 115-121)

The Palestinian people were divided in their stance towards Oslo Accords and the peace process. Fatah Movement was the backbone of the support to the agreement, aided by some small Palestinian factions like the Palestinian Democratic Union (Fida). They saw in this agreement the best practical way to regain WB and GS and to establish the Palestinian independent state. On the other side, there was a very strong opposition to the peace agreement among Islamic, Leftist and national factions. Hamas, PIJ, PFLP, DFLP, beside six other factions formed the “Alliance of the Ten Factions” which rejected Oslo Accords. Furthermore, several Fatah leading members opposed Oslo Accords,. Generally speaking, the main comments and observations on the Oslo Accords can be summarized as follows:

1. As seen by many Muslims, the Palestine issue is the issue of all Muslims and not just the Palestinians. Indeed, it is a cross-generational battle, and no generation is entitled to yield or make concessions that would degrade the following generations. Many Muslim scholars agreed that this peace settlement is not valid and called for jihad to liberate the holy land.
2. The PLO leadership signed this agreement and other agreements followed alone, without consulting the Palestinian people, many of whom objected to these settlements.
3. The PLO command recognized “the right of Israel to exist” and the legitimacy of its occupation of 77% of Palestine in 1948, over which no negotiations will ever take place.
4. The most crucial issues were not tackled and were postponed to the final negotiations stage. Because the PLO committed to never resort to force, the issue became linked to the “generosity” of the Israelis, who held all the cards, and these issues are: a. The future of Jerusalem. b. The future of Palestinian refugees. c. The future of Israeli settlements in the WB and the GS. d. The surface area of the promised Palestinian state, and its sovereignty on its land.

5. The PA's responsibility did not include external security and borders, and no one may enter the PA territory without an Israeli permit. The PA may not form an army, and weapons may only enter upon Israel's permission.
6. Israel has the power of veto over any legislation issued by the PA, during the transitory phase.
7. The agreements do not include any indication to the right of Palestinians to self-determination, or to the establishment of their independent state, nor is there any indication that the WB and the GS are occupied territories, thus reinforcing the impression that they are disputed lands.
8. While the PLO (the PA) pledged both not to use armed struggle against Israel and to resolve its problems through peaceful means, it was also forced—in light of its peaceful commitments—to quash any armed resistance against Israel, and fight the Palestinians who resorted to it. It practically found itself something of a tool for the protection of “Israeli security” in its regions and launched wide and fierce campaigns of arrest as proof of its “good intentions” and in order to maintain peace with Israel. In a nutshell, the situation was as described by the renowned Palestinian writer Edward Said, who said that ‘A rafat involved his people in an inescapable trap;<sup>11</sup> while Palestinian thinker Hisham Sharabi said that the Palestinian command was left unaware of how decisions are made and how fates are decided (**Mohammad 115-121**)

### 1.3.5. The Emergence of the Palestinian Islamist Trend

It is noteworthy that the Islamic trend among the Palestinians was revived during that period, and more people moved towards Islam, after they witnessed, what they believed, the failure of nationalist, secular, and leftist ideologies in resolving the Palestine issue. The participation of the MB Movement in the Palestinian resistance operations in 1968–1970 through what was known as the “Sheikhs’ Camps” in Jordan in coordination with Fatah, was one of the early indications of this revival, as they acted under the cover of Fatah, while maintaining internal administrative autonomy. Close to 300 men were trained and distributed among seven resistance bases. (**Mohammad ,p.104-105**)

Despite their limited resources and participation, MB members offered outstanding examples in strong operations such as the Green Belt Operation on 31/8/1969 and Deir Yasin on 14/9/1969, where 13 of them were killed. In 1980,

the secret organization Usrat al-Jihad (lit. The Family of Jihad) was uncovered in the land that was occupied in 1948 “Israel,” and around 60 of its members were arrested after conducting several operations. The first indications of the establishment of the MB’s military wing appeared when its leadership sent some members abroad for training in 1980. Sheikh Ahmad Yasin established the military wing in GS, and it was first led by ‘Abdul Rahman Tamraz then by Salah Shehadeh. However, the uncovering of the military wing dealt it a blow in 1984 and led to the arrest of Sheikh Ahmad Yasin and some of his companions.

The military wing was restored and rebuilt in 1986 under the name “the Palestinian Mujahidin,” and became active before the 1987 Intifadah. The MB’s security apparatus was established in GS in 1981 as part of the military action, and it was restructured and expanded in 1985. In the summer of 1985, the MB command took the decision of exploiting any incident to take part in the confrontation against the occupation. The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (PIJ) was formed in 1980, and was headed by Dr. Fathi al-Shaqaqi. Its founding members were former members of the MB Movement, and it conducted several resistance operations. The Jihad Brigades (that merged with PIJ) conducted the Mughrabi Gate Operation on 16/10/1986, which killed and injured around 80 Israeli soldiers. Generally speaking, PIJ operations remained limited and modest during that period, compared with other Palestinian organizations, especially Fatah, but nonetheless represented a prelude to a future phase in which it would play a more central role. (**Mohammad ,p.104-105**)

The Islamic movement’s main achievement was its broad popularity and growth, especially since the mid-1970s, both within Palestine and in Jordan, Kuwait, and Lebanon. Islamists began to win in student elections by the end of the 1970s, such as in An-Najah National University in Nablus and the Islamic University–Gaza, as well as in Jordanian universities. They also dominated in trade unions. The Palestinian Islamic movement was strongly present in Kuwait University, where Khalid Mish‘al and some of his companions founded the Islamic Justice list in 1977 for the elections of General Union of Palestinian Students. After his graduation, his colleagues established the Islamic Association for Palestinian Students in 1980. The Palestinian Islamists succeeded in charity, social, and educational work, which enabled them to have a strong and broad base of supporters. Indeed, the Islamic movement (and more specifically the MB Movement) became the principal rival of the secular current represented by Fatah, which controlled the PLO. (**Mohammad ,p.104-105**)

### **1.3.5.1 Background and Inception of HAMAS**

The Islamic Resistance Movement, commonly known as Hamas, rose to prominence during the onset of the first Intifada in December 1987. From its inception, Hamas positioned itself as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement in Palestine, marking a continuation of the MB's longstanding involvement in Palestinian affairs. Thus, Hamas didn't emerge in isolation but rather as an extension of the groundwork laid by the MB in Palestine since 1945, when it began its advocacy work through a network of branches and offices.

Prior to the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, the MB in Palestine operated 25 branches, engaging primarily in preaching, education, and Islamic advocacy. They raised awareness about the Zionist threat and mobilized resistance against external plans for Palestine. While their involvement in the 1947/1948 war was limited due to their recent establishment and modest capabilities, they established paramilitary units in northern and central Palestine. These units, operating under local Arab leaders, conducted raids on Zionist settlements despite their limited training and resources.

Following the war, the MB became one of the most popular groups among Palestinians between 1949 and 1954, thanks to their perceived role in the conflict and their Islamic-national programs. Despite facing challenges, including crackdowns initiated by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, the MB maintained its influence and popularity, especially among Palestinians disillusioned with secular ideologies. (Saleh .p 26-33)

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, amidst a growing Islamic revival and dissatisfaction with secular nationalist movements, the MB began to reassert its presence in Palestinian resistance efforts. This resurgence culminated in the formation of Hamas, which capitalized on the MB's historical legacy, global network, and multifaceted approach encompassing advocacy, education, and social services.

Hamas's emergence as a key player in Palestinian politics and resistance didn't start from scratch but rather built upon the foundation laid by the MB over decades. With its roots deeply embedded in Palestinian society and its multifaceted approach, Hamas quickly rose to prominence, becoming a

significant rival to established factions like Fatah within Palestinian politics (Saleh .p 26-33)

The reasons that explain the rise of Hamas during the period 1987–2005 concern its ability to present a moderate Islamist platform, which has resonated among wide segments of the population. Hamas also showed a dynamism that allowed it to quickly interact with, respond to and adapt to various events and developments. Thanks to this, Hamas was able to produce and replace three generations of field commanders during the first Intifadah. There have been many times that the Israeli authorities have declared an all-out war on Hamas or pledged to eliminate Al-Qassam Brigades, but Hamas would return, stronger and more prolific than ever. Furthermore, Hamas's loss of many of its symbolic political and military leaders usually had only a temporary effect, and its dynamism allowed it to quickly cope with and overcome these setbacks.

Thirdly, Hamas enjoyed a high level of internal cohesion and organizational discipline, compared to other factions, notably Fatah, helped in this by having a strong institutional shura [advisory] structure. This has enabled Hamas to deal effectively with various challenges, and made it difficult for its enemies to penetrate it, fragment it, or deviate it from its course. For this reason, there were neither splits within Hamas nor any important defections by its cadres throughout the outgoing period. The fourth factor is that Hamas was the most effective organization in charitable work and social solidarity. It thus became part of the fabric of Palestinian society and its constituents, making it difficult to blockade or eliminate it. Fifthly, Hamas has distanced itself from the PA and its burdens, and thus it was not implicated in the “sins” of the Oslo Accords and their repercussions, nor did it bear the formal responsibility for managing the Palestinians’ political, economic, or social affairs. (Saleh .p 59-61)

This put the blame for weaknesses and failures on the PA and Fatah movement. Furthermore, the suspicions of corruption, extortion, and dubious deals involving many of the PA’s figures, did not affect any of Hamas’s figures, as Hamas was able to preserve its good reputation throughout that period. Moreover, Hamas distinguished itself in the military field. During al-Aqsa Intifadah, Hamas became the foremost Palestinian faction in terms of military operations, especially daring ones, and in terms of the number of Israelis it killed or wounded. Hamas offered a large number of resistance fighters who were killed, including some leaders. Accordingly, Hamas derived legitimacy and prominence from resistance, earning itself the respect of Palestinians, Arabs, and

the Muslim world. These see armed resistance as the gauge by which things are measures, and proof of credibility and legitimacy.

By the end of 2005, Hamas had succeeded in avoiding spilling Palestinian blood and being drawn to civil strife. This remained a red line despite Hamas came under broad campaigns of arrest and crackdowns by the PA, especially in the years that preceded al-Aqsa Intifada. This kept its image positive among the general public. Although Hamas is an Islamic movement affiliated to a movement that most Arab regimes are hostile to or are actively persecuting, and although Hamas has been designated as a “terror group” in the US and Western Europe, Hamas was able to present a balanced discourse, and restricted its military operations to the Palestinian territories. Hamas could not be drawn into side battles or into intra-Arab disputes, earning it a great deal of respect in the Arab street and even among official Arab circles. (Saleh .p 59-61)

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### **1.3.5.1.1. The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, is an example of armed resistance**

The Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, a military wing of the Islamic resistance movement (Hamas), is closer to the organized army due to its high combat capability and scientific expertise in weapons development and manufacturing. The group was founded in 1986 by Salah Shehada, who later became known as the "Palestinian Mujahideen" in mid-1992. The Qassam Brigades believe in using jihad and resistance as the primary means to regain Palestinian rights and liberate the land from Israeli occupation. Their core objectives include liberating all of Palestine, with Jerusalem as its capital, ensuring the return of refugees, and releasing Palestinian prisoners.

The Brigades view their struggle as against the Zionist occupation rather than Judaism itself. They operate across historical Palestine, from north to south and east to west, with Jerusalem as its center. While willing to accept temporary truces for the well-being of their people, they remain steadfast in their principles and do not recognize Israel. (aljazeera)

Salah Shehada led the first military apparatus until his assassination by Israel on July 23, 2002. The most prominent leaders of the Brigades are Mohammed al-Deif and Ahmed Al-Jabari, who were placed by Israel at the top of The Wanted list. In November 2012, Jabari was martyred by an Israeli raid on a car he was traveling in, making him the de facto commander-in-chief of the Brigades.

At the end of January 2015, an Egyptian court declared the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades a "terrorist organization," which was condemned by the military wings of the Palestinian resistance factions. These Wings described the verdict as an unjust decision that does not serve the interests of both Palestinians and Egyptians and is not consistent with Egypt's role in sponsoring files related to the Palestinian resistance.

The Al-Qassam Brigades carried out many successful jihadist and heroic operations, capturing many Israeli soldiers.

The last of these operations occurred on October 7, 2023, resistance factions led by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades launched the "Al-Aqsa flood" battle, and more than a thousand fighters stormed the settlements of the Gaza envelope and took control of them and the Israeli military centers there.

As a result of this operation, more than 1,300 Israelis were killed - including soldiers and officers - and dozens of Israelis were also captured by the Resistance, including high-ranking officers and soldiers ([aljazeera](#)) .

### **1.4. Popular uprisings as a form of resistance**

Palestinian uprisings usually refer to a series of rebellions and protests that occurred in the occupied Palestinian territories, usually under Israeli rule. The most famous of these uprisings are the First Intifada (or Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 1987, which lasted until 1993, and the Second Intifada (or Second Al-Aqsa Intifada) in 2000, which continued until approximately 2005.

#### **1.4.1. The Blessed Intifadah 1987–1993**

The first Intifadah was known as "al-Intifadah al-Mubarakah" (The Blessed Intifadah) and the uprising of the "Children of the Stones." Although this was not quite the first uprising, it was a landmark event in Palestinian history. For it is through this uprising that the focus of resistance shifted from outside Palestine to inside Palestine. The Intifadah was comprehensive as broad segments, factions, and age groups of the Palestinian people participated. It was also characterized by the emergence of the religious factor and the role of the Islamic movement in mobilizing the resistance. The administrative bureau of the MB movement in the WB and GS had resolved to launch its role in fighting the occupation, in parallel with the launch of the Islamic Resistance Movement—

Hamas at a meeting held in the home of the late Hasan al-Qiq in Dora in the Hebron district, on 23/10/1987.

For the MB movement, what was new about Hamas was that:

1. It resolved the “intermittency” in the military efforts of the MB movement, turning them into a permanent continual effort.
2. It provided a resistance framework for the MB movement, characterized by administrative, political, and military institutions, with a public political leadership.
3. There was a quantum leap in the internal status of the Palestinian MB movement, Hamas believed that it was the one to carry the burden of launching this Intifadah in its early days, as its decision to get on the ground and step up all events took place in parallel with the first moments of the Intifadah. Meanwhile, the PLO and its factions did not participate clearly until after two weeks, when they called to a general strike on 21/12/1987. The factions that form part of the PLO then created the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising—Qawim (UNLU), issuing its first statement on 8/1/1988. (**Saleh .p47-50**)

After the meeting of the MB’s administrative bureau in the WB and GS, on 10/1/1988 in Jerusalem, at the home of Hasan al-Qiq in the Industrial School at the Arab Orphan’s Home, a decision was made to sustain the Intifadah, and expand action into all parts of the WB, using the same methods and tactics seen in GS. As for the decision to abbreviate the Islamic Resistance Movement as Hamas, this was agreed by the administrative bureau at the home of Hasan al-Qiq, who had made the proposal. He would put, in the groups first statements, the letters H, M, S [Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah], to which the letter A was added later, becoming Hamas (lit. enthusiasm). Hamas was not a known faction in the Palestinian arena.

For many months, the media ignored its statements and activities. Furthermore, Hamas had not yet produced political or media figures that could speak in its name, helping the PLO and its factions to come to the limelight during the Intifadah instead. However, Hamas’s ability to organize broad-based events on the ground, lead protests, and stage wide-ranging strikes gave it a lot of credibility, sparking curiosity about the movement and its leaders. (**Saleh .p47-50**)

Two different factions competed over leadership of the Intifadah, the Islamist camp (Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine—PIJ), and the PLO, which had different strategies and goals, but pursued similar resistance activities and tactics, with the Palestinian masses responding positively to both.

This division infuriated the PLO leadership, which found in the rise of the Islamic movement a major challenge

Indeed, the Islamists did not want to accede to the PLO, and had fundamental objections to its political program and the conduct of its leaders and institutions, as well as the domination of Fatah on the PLO. The Islamic movement believed that the PLO did not represent the size and range of political and popular forces on the ground. Since that time, divisions over politics and resistance have marked Palestinian national action. To be sure, Hamas was unwilling to commit to the PLO program, decisions, and commitments, nor was the leadership of the PLO prepared to carry out structural reform to become more democratic, more able to accommodate the various Palestinian segments and factions, and more expressive of a comprehensive national vision that all parties would adhere to .(Saleh .p47-50)

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### 1.4.2.The al-Aqsa Intifadah 2000–2005

Sheikh Ahmad Yasin explained the dispute between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Fatah, Hamas, and factions opposed to the peace process, stating that the Oslo Accords had seeds of failure, which was revealed when the Camp David Summit collapsed in July 2000. The al-Aqsa Intifadah in September 2000 re-ignited Palestinian resistance, tired of negotiations, Israeli stalling tactics, and Israeli attempts to Judaize Jerusalem. The provocative visit by Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon to al-Aqsa Mosque on 28/9/2000 ignited the Intifadah. Between 28/9/2000 and 31/12/2005, Palestinians were killed and injured, with the number of Palestinian detainees in Israel rising to 9,200. In 2005, al-Aqsa Intifadah subsided due to the death of Yasir 'Arafat, Mahmud 'Abbas' election as PA head, and Palestinian factions' de-escalation. Hamas played a major role in self-immolation operations, causing security concerns for Israel. A report by the Shabak indicates that 1,513 Israelis were killed and 3,380 injured between the start of the Intifadah and July 2005. (Saleh .p59-61)

The Palestinian resistance played a significant role in the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in the second half of 2005, with Hamas emerging as the most effective faction. From the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifadah until 15/8/2005, Israelis admitted to 400 resistance operations, causing casualties among the Israelis. Hamas was at the forefront of armed resistance during the intifadah, with several leaders killed. The Palestinian Authority (PA) tried to cope with the momentum of the Intifadah and improve its negotiating position. However,

Israel's arrogance and attempts to crush the Intifadah by overwhelming force inflamed it further and deepened the bitter enmity between Palestinians and Israelis. Despite the massive destruction, economic collapse, and tens of thousands of casualties and wounded, 75-85% of Palestinians supported the continuation of the Intifadah during the first three years of the Intifadah.

The Al-Aqsa Intifadah, a Palestinian resistance movement, proved the expectations of resistance movements and gave them more credibility. Hamas, supported by Fatah, succeeded in dragging the PA into the resistance and imposing the Intifadah's agenda on the PA and disrupting the peace process. Hamas's popularity surged, while Fatah's popularity slumped, and Yasir 'Arafat's popularity declined.

The PA faced an intense tug of war between Israeli-US-European pressure for an end to the Intifadah and further concessions, and Islamic and national resistance forces calling for a national program to escalate the Intifadah and force Israel to withdraw.

All sides agreed that the PA was corrupt and needed fundamental reforms, but Israeli-American dictates demanded Palestinian de-escalation in return for resumption of negotiations.

Israel's conduct showed many Palestinians that the PA could not protect them, as Hamas and resistance forces were carrying out operations that caused panic in Israel and established a balance of terror. To stop the Intifadah and restart negotiations, efforts to start an intra-Palestinian dialogue were made, with resistance forces welcoming dialogue to develop a new national program based on defeating the occupation (Saleh .p59-61) .

Egypt, benefiting from its major role in the Arab world and close relations with the PA, Israel, and the US, called for these talks. One of the most important sessions of this dialogue was held in Cairo between Fatah and Hamas between 10-13/11/2002 and again in January 2003 and 4-7/12/2003, attended by all Palestinian factions.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) failed to achieve its desired outcome due to the lack of commitment from resistance factions to the Oslo Accords and the Israeli side's refusal to commit to a truce or suspend operations against Palestinian civilians. The Intifadah's truce in 2003 was a clear example of Israeli practices, as Israel continued its killings and destruction. Palestinian President 'Arafat was under blockade for two and a half years, angering Israel with his secret support for the Intifadah and armed resistance. He died in 2004, and Mahmud 'Abbas succeeded him as head of the PLO, PA, and Fatah. Fatah

suffered from fragmentation, disbandment, corruption, and conflict among factions and leaders, causing a decline in its stature and popularity. Hamas managed to maintain its cohesion, discipline, and positive image due to its resistance activities and social and educational services. Hamas boycotted the Palestinian presidential election in 2005, which was won by Mahmud 'Abbas. However, Hamas dealt positively with the PA leadership, particularly regarding its declaration of a truce for holding municipal and legislative elections. The municipal elections in 2005 showed Hamas's rising popularity, with Fatah winning in small municipal councils and Hamas winning in large cities and municipalities. (Saleh .p59-61)

In the end, we can say that the Palestinian issue is considered one of the most prominent humanitarian and political issues in the world, as the Palestinian people seek to achieve their basic rights and establish an independent and sovereign state on their historical land.

Palestinian resistance forms the core of this issue, as Palestinians resort to a variety of means and methods to confront the Israeli occupation, including armed resistance, popular resistance, diplomacy, and peaceful protests.

Despite the great challenges facing the Palestinian resistance, the will of the Palestinian people and their determination to defend their rights does not weaken, and the Palestinian issue remains the subject of broad international interest and support.

## *Chapter Two:*

*The Politics of Demonization:  
Impact on the Palestinian  
Struggle for Freedom and  
Justice*

Undoubtedly the demonization of the PR is a multifaceted phenomenon that is deeply intertwined with international and regional geopolitical changes and the dynamics of existing political power. The meaning of demonization is an "to try to make someone or a group of people seem as if they are evil" (**Dictionary**). So, at its core the concept of demonization involves portraying PR groups as violent or extremist in their resistance to the occupation and often ignoring the social and political context of their struggle against the occupation. This demonization has far-reaching consequences, as it will shape international perceptions and policies regarding the Palestinian issue. It works to delegitimize legitimate resistance efforts, hindering the pursuit of justice and self-determination for Palestinians. Moreover, this distortion of the narrative perpetuates a skewed balance of power, strengthening Israel and its allies in the region.

According to what was mentioned, it can be said that " Demonization consists of the process through which the source is sacralized with dialectical and discursive resources such as discretion, integrity, or goodwill, promoting a symbolic construction of reality created under the conceptual simplification protagonist–antagonist, which causes the “other” to be not culturally accepted, inferior or inconsiderate, carrying with it discrimination, paradigms of hatred and stereotypes, and clichés, which, therefore, devalue it morally and perceptively, damaging their social identity and even their identity self-recognition" (**Civila and and others**).

This is what applies to the Palestinians, who are the owners of the land and the owners of a right that has been taken away by force and systematic, public and exposed injustice. However, due to the multifaceted practice of demonization, especially the media, the Palestinian citizen can no longer live in dignity, as the recent incidents in Gaza have revealed (especially since October 7, 2023). The extent of the destruction, killing, and abuse of the bodies of martyrs and innocent children in homes, streets, schools, and hospitals.

## 2.1. Demonizing the PR at the international level.

After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the Iranian *Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini* similarly branded the **USA** “the Great Satan” and Israel, its “little Satan” companion. Equating one’s adversary with the Devil is not a new phenomenon. (**Normand .P25**). Therefore, the phenomenon of demonization is old, and has been known to many countries and societies, but at the present time it can be said that the Palestinian situation proves that the great powers, especially the United States of America, Britain, France, and others, are working to make the PR a terrorist organization, and its oppression must be stopped by all oppressive means and hateful colonialism.

Simply put, the behavior of the Israeli aggression against Palestine and Gaza revealed the position of Western countries to what extent these countries and international organizations support Israel in exterminating and killing Palestinians. "The Palestinian territories are going through horrific developments, in just two weeks as more than 5,000 people have been martyred there, including more than 2,000 children. The war machine continues to take lives indiscriminately without any discrimination. It is shameful that some continue to justify what is happening with the right to self-defense and resistance to terrorism". (**Nations**)

So, The **US** and **EU** significant actors in the region, often label PR groups like **Hamas** and **Islamic Jihad** as terrorist organizations. "Such efforts are clearest today in Gaza, where members of the international community deal with the strip variously as a humanitarian challenge or a terroristic security threat. Within such a framing, the political drivers that have given rise to the current situation in Gaza are effectively marginalized". (**Baconi 55**). All of this neutral international position of Israel is the result of the influence of the Zionist lobby on international policies in general and American foreign policy in particular," it "has a core consisting of organizations whose declared purpose is to encourage the U.S. government and the American public to provide material aid to Israel and to support its government's policies, as well as influential individuals for whom these goals are also a top priority" (**Walt**)

This labeling influences regional politics, as many Arab states align their policies with these international powers for strategic and economic reasons. Media outlets in the region often reflect the political stance of their governments, resulting in coverage that demonizes PR activities to maintain favorable relations with Western powers and to combat the influence of Iran. "Israel is no longer looking for participation and cooperation with the Arabs. Rather, it wants normalization with their governments that guarantees its hegemony and control over their capabilities, and it wants to impose normalization on the Arab peoples by force and coercion. Therefore, it proceeded to sign peace agreements with many Arab governments, regardless of the positions of its people who reject it". ([aljazeera](#))

In this way, "the UN Security Council faced obstacles in taking decisive action on the situation in Gaza mainly due to the United States, which vetoed more than 40 resolutions. The United States' steadfast support for the Israeli occupation and aggression has made it an active part of the problem, and other Western countries have tried to shift blame from the wrongdoer to the victim. International law and the United Nations Charter recognize the legitimate right to self-determination, as well as the right of the Palestinian people to self-defense, including resistance groups such as Hamas." ([Nations](#))

The recent events in Gaza (especially since October 7, 2023) and the resulting multiple international positions have revealed that the international community organizations and their member states are mostly supportive of Israel in the process of killing, displacing, and starving Palestinians. Where in this context "The Muslims demonization is carried out fundamentally by relating, by conceptual simplification, Muslims to terrorism. By constructing the suspected subject as a 'potentially terrorist Muslim', society can misinterpret this group's nature and generate a community feeling that damages the social perception of people who practice Islam. In this way, all Arabs may be identified as radical Muslims and terrorists, offering a mistaken and widespread image of Arab countries that, out of ignorance, causes other societies to turn away from it out of fear, which eventually results in the stigmatization of the

Muslim community, racism, and Islamophobia" (**Civila and and others**)

In recent years, as American policy has increasingly converged with that of Israel, this process of persuasion has grown more difficult for United States policymakers. Absent such persuasion, there have been increasing internal difficulties for Arab governments perceived by their own public opinion to be supine before a United States totally biased in favor of Israel. Moreover, in the wake of the murderous suicide attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York and Washington, the convergence between the policies of the **George W. Bush** administration and the **Ariel Sharon** government in Israel reached the point that they were virtually indistinguishable in a number of realms, notably as regards what had become their shared rhetoric on the topic of "terrorism." Palestinian militant groups like **Hamas** and **Islamic Jihad** were lumped together with **Al-Qaeda** in the statements of the Bush administration and the Israeli government, and this approach has since become enshrined in American laws on terrorism. (**Khalidi**)

In this context, "The United States and Israel have actively colluded to prevent a Palestinian state and resolve the situation in Israel's favor. Brokers of Deceit bares the truth about why peace in the Middle East has been impossible to achieve: for decades, US policymakers have masqueraded as unbiased agents working to bring the two sides together, when, in fact, they have been the agents of continuing injustice, effectively preventing the difficult but essential steps needed to achieve peace in the region" (**Khalidi**).

In this way, American support for Israel did not bring peace and security to the Palestinians. Rather, it increased the intensity of the conflict, expanded the construction of settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, and increased the displacement of the indigenous population from their land and their material and moral property. "The Biden administration has reaffirmed U.S. support for a two-state solution but hasn't moved to restart negotiations. It has instead promoted Israeli-Arab normalization and resumed aid for Palestinians" (**Robinson**).

Today, Israel remains the United States' closest strategic partner in the Middle

East. Both countries are concerned about Iran's nuclear ambitions and its support for Islamist militants, particularly Lebanon's Hezbollah and Hamas. As a result of these shared interests, the United States has pledged to help safeguard Israel's military superiority over any hostile combination of countries in the region. By law, the U.S. government must ensure that any arms sales to other Middle Eastern states do not "adversely affect Israel's qualitative military edge over military threats to Israel" (Robinson)

Demonizing the PR is a Western strategy that achieves common interests between Western countries and Israel and expands the scope of Western control over the Middle East region. Therefore, "the European Union is considered Israel's largest trading partner, accounting for 28.8% of its trade in goods in 2022. 31.9% of Israel's imports came from the EU, and 25.6% of the country's exports went to the EU " (Commission).

In addition, "the European Neighbourhood Policy provides political and financial assistance to Israel. Due to Israel's advanced level of economic development, EU funds under the European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI) are mostly used for twinning and public administration (TAIEX) projects in the areas of education, telecommunication and water management. On average, this amounts to €1.8 million per year ". (Commission) This economic and financial partnership between the European Union countries and Israel further encourages Israel's hostile policies against the Palestinians, and supports the colonial methods in Palestine of sabotage, killing, displacement, violence, ...etc. All of this overt and hidden criminal behavior against the Palestinian resistance is due to the lack of political will to confront the occupier, or because, "as one author put it, Arab leaders showed naiveté in politics and weakness in diplomacy." (Nassar .p82)

## **2.2. Demonizing the PR at the internal and regional levels.**

The demonization of the PR at the internal and regional levels is considered the most important point in our topic, because it is linked to the internal construction of

the Palestinian state and the internal fabric of the elements of the multi-ideological and multi-cultural Palestinian society. On this basis, the Palestinian state "today is facing enormous pressure. Lack of international and regional political support, coupled with declining economic support and internal legitimacy...This is especially true given Israel's seeming commitment to eminent annexation of much of the Palestinian Authority (PA)'s promised territory. But Palestinian society Palestinians are more fragmented, demobilized, and politically stagnant than ever before" (**Kurd 82**).

The PR movement is fragmented, primarily between Fatah and Hamas. This division has often led to mutual accusations and campaigns to discredit each other. Fatah, which controls the West Bank, and Hamas, which governs Gaza, have different approaches and ideologies. Fatah is generally more open to negotiations with Israel, while Hamas maintains a more hardline stance. The most important point on which the resistance is based is the non-recognition of Israel, as "Hamas consistently rejects any possibility for recognition of the State of Israel" (**Wilson 05**) and on this basis" Tensions between Fatah and Hamas have dominated Palestinian politics since 2006, when Hamas was victorious in the Palestinian Authority's last parliamentary elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, ending the era of Fatah's dominance. After armed conflict between the two factions and the failure of an attempted unity government, the Palestinian leadership has been divided since 2007, with the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority governing the West Bank, and Hamas governing the Gaza Strip". (**Norman**)

Internal propaganda from both factions often paints the other as illegitimate or harmful to the Palestinian cause, which can contribute to a negative perception of the resistance depending on one's political alignment. So, "Hamas doesn't need to "win" wars in the traditional sense to be victorious. By simply resisting, it affirms its legitimacy and popularity, which has tended to surge after such escalations in the past. This is especially in comparison to the Palestinian Authority, which is seen as weak at best and complicit at worst in terms of relations with Israel. This doesn't

mean that Hamas' ideology or governance is popular; there is widespread dissatisfaction with conditions in Gaza that some blame on Hamas as well as Israel. But Hamas is wasting no time in seizing the moment in the current crisis to bolster its standing, both in Gaza and beyond. (Norman)

Within Palestinian territories, there are significant divisions between factions such as Fatah and Hamas. These internal rivalries can lead to mutual demonization, where each group may portray the other as illegitimate or harmful to Palestinian interests. For instance, Fatah may depict Hamas as a radical entity that brings unnecessary conflict, while Hamas might portray Fatah as corrupt and compromised by cooperation with Israeli authorities. "The opportunity for Hamas to transition its ideology into the political sphere came in the form of planned presidential and legislative elections in 2006. Hamas's prospective engagement with the elections had to contend with a central tension: it disapproved of the premise of the PNA and the underlying Oslo Accords that had created it .As the movement considered engagement in the political process, it sustained its armed operations, in keeping with its perception that it could "marry" resistance with politics" (Baconi ,p60).

Neighboring countries have their own strategic interests which often involve supporting or demonizing different Palestinian factions. For example, Egypt and Jordan have historically been wary of Hamas due to its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, leading to efforts to weaken its influence. "Egyptian policy towards Hamas is driven by multiple and sometimes conflicting goals, and can only be understood through the intersection of domestic and foreign policy lenses. Increasingly Hamas and the *Sisi* regime appear interdependent, as both parties have a mutual interest in maintaining a semblance of a good relationship. Not only does the regime need Hamas' support in Sinai, but it needs to maintain a close relationship to preserve its regional influence as a mediator, to minimize the influence of its regional competitors (Turkey and Qatar) in Gaza. Meanwhile, Hamas needs a minimum level of Egyptian goodwill to allow for the inflow of much needed supplies across the border, either legally through the crossing or illegally through the tunnels, and for the

regime to act as a mediator on behalf of the group. Hence, the two parties remain locked in an embrace, dictated by forces beyond their control". (**Mandour, Egypt's Shifting Hamas Policies**)

Regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia have their own proxies and allies within Palestinian territories. Iran's support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad is part of its broader strategy to extend its influence in the region, while Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states may support rival factions to counterbalance Iranian influence. This results in a complex web of alliances and enmities, where demonizing Palestinian resistance groups becomes a tool for regional powers to advance their interests. "Most are suspicious, if not hostile, toward Hamas and the ideology it represents. Hamas is considered a militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood that undermines Egyptian national security and the government of the Palestinian Authority. In addition, Hamas is perceived by some of these countries as a hostile organization because it maintains contacts with Iran". (**Guzansky ,p157**)

So, Iranian support for the Palestinian resistance produced a negative reaction, especially from the rulers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, to the activity of the Palestinian resistance. The Hamas movement was subjected to great pressure with the aim of abandoning its arms, abandoning the idea of resistance, and surrendering to Israeli conditions and the normalization process. "When **Mohamed Morsi** was deposed in a military coup and the new regime deemed the Brotherhood a "terrorist" organization. Egypt accused Hamas, the Brotherhood's sister group that rules Gaza, of contributing to the security crisis in northern Sinai and closed down the smuggling tunnels." (**Guardian**)

Given the geopolitical location of the Palestinian resistance movement and its military and political activity that is constantly disturbing to the occupying Zionist entity, the State of Egypt plays an important role in the process of resistance activity and its internal and regional struggle path, as it "the toppling of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has left Hamas particularly isolated. President **Sisi**'s administration views Hamas as part of the same Islamist problem that it is fighting in its own country, particularly in the Sinai. As such Egypt is going to great lengths to

destroy smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt and is effectively enforcing a blockade by keeping the Rafah crossing for the most part closed. Further moves have also been taken to outlaw and shutdown Hamas within Egypt itself ". (Wilson ,p02)

Undoubtedly that Egypt's historical relationship with Hamas is tense, primarily due to Hamas's roots in the Muslim Brotherhood which the Egyptian government previously considered a terrorist organization and then retracted, "the demonization of Hamas at one time played an important role in Sisi's repression campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood, with the Brotherhood cast as conspiring with Hamas to destroy the Egyptian state. Although this rhetoric would wane and give way to a policy of cooperation, this purported collusion provided justification for both continued repression of the Brotherhood and blockade of the Gaza strip, deeply intertwining anti-Hamas rhetoric with domestic Egyptian politics. When the late President **Mohammed Morsi** was sentenced to death in 2015 for conspiring with foreign organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah, Hamas was prominently linked to the Brotherhood in plotting to overthrow the Egyptian state". (Mandour) But Egypt also plays a crucial role in mediating between Hamas and Israel, as well as about providing humanitarian aid. To the Gaza Strip. Egypt's main aspects regarding the Palestinian resistance include some aspects, including mediation efforts, as Egypt has often played the role of mediator in conflicts between Hamas and Israel.

This role was crucial in negotiating a ceasefire and trying to stabilize the region. Secondly, it includes border control, as Egypt controls the Rafah border crossing, which is the only passage to Gaza that is not controlled by Israel. While Egypt occasionally opens the crossing to allow the passage of people and goods, it also closes it often, due to security concerns. In the context of security concerns that made Egypt consider Hamas a terrorist organization, the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula has become a hotspot for armed activity, some of which is linked to Gaza. As a result, Egypt is keen to monitor the movement of armed mujahidin and weapons between Gaza and Sinai. Despite its hostile stance towards Hamas, Egypt allowed humanitarian aid to pass through Rafah into Gaza, especially during and after the

aggression.

In short, while Egypt does not support Hamas in the traditional sense, it engages with Hamas primarily for practical reasons, balancing its security interests with regional stability and humanitarian concerns.

### **2.3. The role of the media in spreading the demonization of the Palestinian resistance**

In the beginning, modern media and communication have a major role in spreading news, revealing facts, and creating a global public opinion that follows events and news anywhere in the world, whether this news is true or incorrect. Therefore, in our topic, "The role of the media and academic studies in spreading the demonization of the Palestinian resistance is a complex and multifaceted issue that involves various factors and actors. This language creates a dichotomy where Palestinians are seen as inherently evil, justifying their portrayal as enemies that need to be defeated. How victimhood is politicized, often depicting Israelis as innocent victims while Palestinians are portrayed as aggressors. This narrative simplifies the complex reality of the conflict and supports the justification for disproportionate violence against Palestinians. (Vargas) . As an example of this "One particularly familiar face is the Palestinian Ambassador to the UK, **Husam Zumlot**, who was persistently and relentlessly required by presenters and anchors in mainstream media, such as **CNN**, **BBC**, **Sky News**, and **Sky News Australia/Talk TV**, to condemn the Hamas attack on Israel and even to apologise for it" (Vargas)

As another instance, the **BBC** mistranslated the testimony of a Palestinian hostage who was set free, subtitling the fragment to say "Only Hamas cared ... And we love them very much". In reality, she said, in Arabic: "As winter came, they cut off the electricity. We almost died from the cold weather. They sprayed us with pepper spray and left us to die inside the prison." The **BBC** has since corrected the translation and added a clarification stating the inaccurate subtitles were due to "an error in the editing process". (Jong)

Israeli propaganda has historically used significant events, such as the Holocaust, to portray itself as an eternal victim, enabling it to commit mass atrocities with impunity, including the mass killings in Gaza, the blockade, and the displacement of Palestinians, as efforts to reinforce Israeli settler colonialism. In terms of numbers, "The number of martyrs in the recent Gaza events (2024) reached more than 36,379 martyrs in the Gaza Strip, including 15162 Kids, 10018 Woman ,1049 elderly,492 Medical staff martyrs,147 Press Martyrs,246 Educational staff martyrs,152 UN staff martyrs..." (**Ministry Of Health**). These non-final statistics reveal to us that Israel is practicing a policy of comprehensive destruction in Palestine, and is working in all colonial ways to implement a "de facto policy" by force without taking into account legal texts and human feelings.

So, "**Hamas'** attack and the suffering it wrought was newsworthy – it was shocking, direct physical violence. But while the eyes of the world were now focussed on the region, Israel's massive retaliation did not receive nearly the same amount or type of coverage. Instead, it was frequently uncritically framed as self-defense. This discrepancy can be attributed to news values, where proximity, prominence, human interest, and conflict play a role. But while newsworthiness is important, it should never result in biased reporting. (**Jong**)

According to this context, "In a press conference, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu compared Palestinians to the Amalekites, a tribe mentioned in the Hebrew Bible that the Israelites were commanded to annihilate completely. Netanyahu referenced this biblical passage, emphasizing the importance of remembering and combating their enemies. He praised Israeli forces in Gaza and other regions, linking their efforts to a historical chain of Jewish heroes spanning 3,000 years. Netanyahu declared that the primary objective of Israeli forces is to utterly destroy their ruthless enemy and secure Israel's survival". (**Inc**)

In addition to the above, it is quite literally disgusting to see the way the U.S. gives nothing but unequivocal support for Ukrainians, the occupied, while providing the same unequivocal support for the occupier, Israel. Let us now take a look at what

a handful of mainstream media coverage looks like, shall we? *CNN* posted a clip on its Instagram featuring anchor Christiane Amanpour discussing a hostage incident with the headline, "Video appears to show Israeli woman taken hostage." Footage is then shown of an Israeli woman being forced into a black Jeep as Amanpour details the woman's condition, to justify whether this action is right or wrong is not the point. Where was this same coverage when the Israeli Defense Forces continuously took Palestinians as hostages? Where was *CNN* then? (**Abd-Elhameed**) .

An almost unanimous consensus has emerged in global opinion that the Western media coverage as a whole was not fair or just, and that it showed a clear bias towards the Israeli side, and that this bias clearly revealed the status and credibility of the Western media, which it always advertises.

At the level of Arab media, We find ourselves facing a different path, where "Screens that follow countries that have moved in the direction of normalization, recognizing Israel and celebrating the growing relations with it, and reflect policies of Arab capitals that have clearly bet on economic partnerships from Tel Aviv, and political guarantees for the continuation of their rule after the Arab Spring made them not only be wary of its dimensions and future potential, but even go so far as to thwart it. Harassing its symbols and eliminating all its chances to change the Arab reality in the direction of freedom, democracy, and ensuring the sovereignty of states and peoples who have their own free decisions". (**Al-Rihani**)

Therefore, we note that the Arab media can be divided into two levels. The first is media that serves the Palestinian cause and is biased toward highlighting just issues in the world and revealing the truth of the situation in Palestine with all credibility, such as *Al-Jazeera*, *Alalam News* channel, the *Algerian media*, and others. While we notice on the other level that the countries that normalize relations with Israel or follow the policy of normalization with the Zionist entity, their media seeks to falsify the facts and publishes them as the Western and Zionist media publish them, and demonizes the resistance and defends Israel more than Israel defends itself.

As a final point in this topic, *social media* or *social networks* via the Internet helped reveal the truth about the demonization of the Palestinian resistance, which made the world, countries, institutions, and individuals know the truth about what is happening in Palestine and the truth about the media that is biased towards the Zionist project or not. Social media also plays a role in this topic. A major role in the strategies of oppression and killing practiced in Palestine due to the enormous time that individuals spend every day on social platforms and applications such as: *X, Facebook, WeChat, ShareChat, Instagram, Pinterest, QZone, Weibo, VK, Tumblr, Baidu Tieba, LinkedIn, YouTube, Letterboxd, QQ, Quora, Telegram, WhatsApp, Signal, LINE, Snapchat, Pinterest, Viber, Reddit, Discord, TikTok, Microsoft Teams and Wikis.*

## **2.4. Demonizing the PR: Impact on Libertarian Strategies for Palestinian Liberation.**

The demonization of the PR has significant and multifaceted impacts on the conflict, the international community, and the people involved. Here are some key areas where these impacts can be observed:

### ***a) Political Impacts***

The demonization of the PR has profound political effects. It shapes public perception, often leading to a binary narrative where one side is vilified while the other is exonerated, regardless of the complexity of the situation. This narrative affects international diplomacy, influencing the policies and stance of various countries towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Countries sympathetic to Israel might harden their stance against Palestinian demands, citing terrorism and violence, while those sympathetic to Palestinians might see these actions as a struggle for liberation against occupation.

Domestically, within Israel and the Palestinian territories, this demonization polarizes societies. In Israel, it can bolster right-wing policies and justify stringent

security measures, further entrenching occupation policies. For Palestinians, it can lead to internal divisions and radicalization, as moderate voices are drowned out by those advocating for more extreme measures in response to perceived injustice and demonization. "For instance, in the Palestine case specifically, some scholars point out that Hamas's engagement in violent tactics such as suicide bombing was actually effective in gaining concessions from Israel".(Kurd ,P.82)

Furthermore, demonization affects humanitarian efforts. It can lead to decreased international aid for Palestinians, as donors might fear being associated with terrorism, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis. Media coverage is also influenced, often depicting Palestinians in a negative light, which can desensitize the global audience to their plight and reduce pressure on Israel to change its policies.

Lastly, this demonization undermines peace efforts. It creates an environment where mutual trust is nearly impossible, and negotiations are viewed with suspicion. Without a balanced perspective, achieving a sustainable and just resolution to the conflict becomes significantly more challenging. "they found that most Palestinians prefer armed resistance, given what they see as the futility of the ongoing process and the impending annexation threat" (Kurd ,P.82)

The demonization of the Palestinian resistance has had significant impacts on the libertarian course of the Palestinian cause. This complex issue can be examined from multiple perspectives; the demonization shifts the focus from the legitimate grievances and rights violations faced by Palestinians. Issues such as illegal settlements, forced evictions, and the blockade of Gaza get overshadowed by security narratives. This shift in focus makes it harder for human rights organizations and advocates to draw attention to violations and mobilize international support for Palestinian rights.

### ***b) Economic and Social Impacts***

The demonization of the Palestinian resistance has profound economic and social impacts. Economically, it leads to heightened instability and uncertainty in the region, deterring foreign investment and tourism. This exacerbates the already fragile

Palestinian economy, which is heavily dependent on international aid and remittances. The portrayal of resistance as terrorism, often results in stricter financial sanctions and restrictions, further isolating Palestinian businesses from global markets. The limited economic opportunities contribute to high unemployment rates and widespread poverty, creating a cycle of economic despair.

Socially, demonization fosters deep-seated prejudices and hostilities. It shapes public perception globally, often painting the entire Palestinian population with a broad brush of extremism, "It was the Jewish policy to encourage the Arabs to quit their homes..., it was imperative to rid their forthcoming state of as many Arabs as possible". (Nassar .p,80) which in turn fuels discrimination and xenophobia against Palestinians and those of Arab descent. This narrative marginalizes their voices in international discourse, reducing the complexities of their struggle to simplistic and negative stereotypes. Within Palestinian society, the stigmatization can lead to internal divisions and a sense of betrayal, particularly when international allies adopt these negative frames.

Moreover, the demonization impacts the mental health of Palestinians, contributing to feelings of dehumanization and hopelessness. It also hampers peace efforts by entrenching narratives that justify ongoing conflict and resistance to negotiation. The societal polarization extends beyond the region, affecting diasporas and international communities, and influencing foreign policies and aid decisions. Thus, the demonization of Palestinian resistance not only undermines economic stability but also perpetuates social fragmentation and hinders prospects for a peaceful resolution.


***Economic Sanctions:*** Demonization may lead to economic sanctions and reduced aid to Palestinian territories, worsening the humanitarian situation and economic conditions.

***Social Tensions:*** Within countries, it can increase social tensions, leading to discrimination or violence against Palestinian diasporas and their supporters.

**(ESCWA)**

The portrayal of Palestinians as aggressors or terrorists legitimizes harsh measures against them, including military actions, blockades, and the construction of barriers. These measures, often framed as necessary for security, lead to widespread human rights violations, including loss of life, restricted movement, and economic hardship. By casting Palestinians in a negative light, these actions gain broader acceptance both domestically within Israel and internationally. **(ESCWA)**

Demonization affects Palestinians on a personal and communal level, impacting their identity and agency. Constant negative portrayals can lead to internalized oppression, affecting the morale and psychological well-being of Palestinian communities. It also undermines their agency, portraying them as victims or aggressors rather than active agents in their own struggle for justice.



# **GENERAL CONCLUSION**

The systematic demonization of the PR significantly undermines the libertarian aspirations of the Palestinian cause. This demonization involves portraying the resistance in a uniformly negative light, often characterizing it as inherently violent or illegitimate, which obscures the complex socio-political realities driving the Palestinian struggle for self-determination and human rights.

Firstly, The Zionist movement seeks to demonize the PR by all media and political means, and at the regional and international levels, in order to defend Israel and the interests of powerful countries, especially the United States of America, in the Middle East region.


Secondly, the demonization of PR contributes to the marginalization of Palestinian voices on the global stage. It creates an environment where Palestinians are often perceived through the lens of suspicion and hostility, which stymies efforts to garner international solidarity and support. This environment also discourages meaningful dialogue and negotiation, as the demonization strategy aims to delegitimize the Palestinian cause rather than address its legitimate grievances and aspirations. On this basis, we conclude that the Palestinian resistance with all its factions is rooted in Palestinian society and is the only way to achieve freedom and independence. What was taken by force can only be restored by force.

Thirdly, the recent Israeli aggression against Gaza since October 7, 2023 has revealed that the Zionist movement is using Western and Arab media in support of the Israeli occupation and is spreading rumors about the demands of the Palestinian people to gain their legitimate and just independence. This aggression also revealed the global and Arab reaction to the actions of the Palestinian resistance, which on the ground; it provided a great force in defense of Palestine and the honor of the Arab Islamic nation as a whole.

Moreover, this systematic demonization undermines the libertarian aspect of the Palestinian cause, which is rooted in the struggle for freedom, justice, and equality. By overshadowing the legitimate quest for self-determination and human rights with images

of violence and terror, the demonization campaign detracts from the fundamental principles of liberty that underlie the PR. It also diverts attention from the broader context of occupation, settlement expansion, and systemic inequalities faced by Palestinians.

Finally, the systematic demonization of the PR has a profound and detrimental impact on the libertarian trajectory of the Palestinian cause. It distorts public perception, influences international policies, marginalizes Palestinian voices, and detracts from the core principles of freedom and justice. To foster a more just and equitable resolution, it is crucial to challenge these demonizing narratives and recognize the legitimate aspirations and diverse forms of resistance within the Palestinian struggle.



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## Abstract

This study addresses the problem of demonizing the Palestinian resistance, so the systematic demonization of the Palestinian resistance involves framing Palestinian efforts to reclaim their rights and territory as inherently violent or terroristic, often disregarding the context of occupation and oppression they face. This narrative is perpetuated by various media, whether Arab or Western, political entities, and lobbying groups (Zionist lobby), which present a one-sided view that delegitimizes the Palestinian struggle. As a result, the global perception of the Palestinian cause is skewed, leading to diminished international support and solidarity. This demonization undermines the libertarian aspect of the Palestinian cause, which centers on self-determination, freedom, and human rights. Consequently, it hinders efforts to achieve a just and lasting resolution to the conflict, perpetuating the cycle of injustice.

**Key Words:** The Palestinian issue. Palestinian resistance. Demonization. The media

## ملخص:

تعالج هذه الدراسة إشكالية شيطنة المقاومة الفلسطينية، حيث تتضمن عملية شيطنة المقاومة الفلسطينية بشكل منحي تصوير الجهود الفلسطينية لاستعادة حقوقهم وأراضيهم على أنها جهود عنيفة أو إرهابية بطبيعتها، وغالباً ما تتجاهل سياق الاحتلال والقمع الذي يواجهونه. يتم إدامة هذه الرواية من قبل وسائل الإعلام المختلفة سواء العربية أو الغربية والكيانات السياسية ومجموعات الضغط (اللوي الصهيوني)، التي تقدم وجهة نظر أحادية الجانب تزعزع الشرعية عن النضال الفلسطيني. ونتيجة لذلك، انحرف التصور العالمي للقضية الفلسطينية، مما أدى إلى تضاؤل الدعم والتضامن الدوليين. إن هذه الشيطنة تقوض الجانب التحرري للقضية الفلسطينية، والتي تركز على تقرير المصير والحرية وحقوق الإنسان. وبالتالي، فهو يعيق الجهود الرامية إلى التوصل إلى حل عادل ودائم للصراع، مما يؤدي إلى إدامة دائرة الظلم.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** المسألة الفلسطينية. المقاومة الفلسطينية. الشيطنة. الإعلام