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The Role of the American Diplomacy in Advancing the Normalization of Arab-Israeli Relations

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To those who believe that the Palestinians have the right to live freely on their land.

Abstract :

American diplomacy, across the various stages of the Arab-Israeli conflict, played an important role in the process of historical events, starting with the partition decision after the Balfour promise and the British mandate in Palestine, all the way to the various wars and conflicts. Perhaps what is prominent in all of these events is the protection that Israel enjoys from the United States. The United States of America despite its trampling on all international regulations and laws, including the UN Security Council, which is in fact the result of the influence of the Zionist lobby in the American decision-making centers. Through this research, we will try to diagnose the historical roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict through various historical stations in the first chapter and in the second chapter we discuss the role of American policy in pushing the normalization process with various political and economic temptations, in which we take some examples in which Israel, and behind it America, tried to give legitimacy to the normalization process with some countries that are in fact geographically microscopic, such as the Emirates and Bahrain, but they give some legitimacy to the normalization process in a symbolic capacity. And some countries of economic importance, such as Sudan and Egypt, in addition to other countries with religious symbolism, such as Saudi Arabia, which is considered the beating heart of the Islamic world, and which America seeks with all its might to push it towards normalization with Israel. Finally, we look at the recent events in the October 7 War, known as the Al-Aqsa Flood, the events of which are still casting a shadow. Until now, which has mixed all calculations and demonstrated the extent of falsehood and double standards in this world through the massacres committed in the Gaza Strip and the systematic starvation policy used by Israel in full view of the world, which led to the collapse of what is known as the system of global values and conscience.

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Introduction

Since 1967, there has been no country more involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, whether in its armed or peaceful dimension than the United States. Despite its status as the largest supporter and ally of the Jewish state, its status as a major global power, the main player in international relations make from the US the most present actor in the Middle East region. Starting from the end of the Cold War, it became the primary sponsor of the peace process between the Arab countries and Israel.

Given the major interests of the United States in the Middle East, economically, strategically and politically, Washington was keen to reduce tension between the two conflicting parties and bring relations between them to a "normal" situation, meaning mutual recognition and establishing diplomatic relations and economic cooperation, on the premise that peace in the region will bring stability and prosperity for all and promotes international peace as a whole.

During the Cold War, the United States only succeeded in reaching a peace agreement and establishing diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel in the wake of the 1973 war. We had to wait for the end of the Cold War and a change in geopolitical realities at the global and regional levels to witness the launch of a process of negotiation and mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization within the framework of The Oslo process, followed by the normalization of relations between Israel and Jordan in ,1994Mauritania in 1999, then the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco in 2020.

The issue of normalization represents an important topic for understanding American foreign policy in the Middle East and extrapolating the possible developments of the Palestinian issue, but also for its impact on the Arab-Arab relations, and their relations with the other regional actors such as Iran and Turkey.

Although the process of normalizing relations between Israel and some Arab countries seems to be a private matter for both parties, the United States may be the most interested party in the issue given the nature of its strong relations with the countries of the region, which include some of its most important allies and political, military, and economic partners. Therefore, the United States was the main driver of the normalization process and benefited most from its results.

On the other hand, the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict remained a top priority for successive American administrations, but the success of these administrations in achieving progress in the peace process in the Middle East was not at the same level, and this is due to a number of factors related to the circumstantial American strategies and the regional conditions in each time stage.

On this basis, the study aims to trace the path of the Arab-Israeli normalization under the auspices of the United States, and to know the factors that led to reaching normalization treaties. The study also aims to extrapolate the possible repercussions of the normalization process on the Palestinian issue and on inter-states relations in the region.

Concerning the research problem, the study starts from a central question: How did American diplomacy move the Arab-Israeli conflict from its tense state to the stage of normalization of political relations?

The following sub-questions arise from this research problem:

- How did American policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict evolve, and what are the different roles played by American diplomacy in managing this conflict?

- How did the United States succeed in getting some Arab countries to normalize their relations with Israel, and what are the interests of each party in the process?

- What are the repercussions of Arab-Israeli normalization on the region in general and on the Palestinian issue in particular?

From a methodological standpoint, we adopted the historical approach to track the development of American diplomacy in order to normalize Arab-Israeli relations. We also adopted, as a theoretical framework, the rational actor approach, which emphasizes that the decisions issued by the decision-maker in foreign policy stem primarily from calculations of the national interest and serve goals related to the internal situation of each country according to the preferences and priorities defined at each stage. It is the framework that explains why the states engaged in the normalization process took this step despite its sensitivity in view of the long history of hostility between the Arab countries and the Zionist occupation state.

The dissertationis divided in two chapters. The first chapter gives a historical background of the Arab Israeli conflict, and the evolution of the American involvement in the Middle East affairs, particularly in the pursuit of integrating Israel within its neighbourhood through peace agreements and other diplomatic means. The second chapter focuses on the last wave of normalization between some Arab countries and Israel in the framework of the so-called "Abraham Accords", its motives, consequences and future impacts on the inter-state relations in the region.

Chapter One:

Historical background to the American role in the Arab-Israeli conflict

1.Historical background to the American role in the Arab-Israeli conflict

Before talking about the Arab-Israeli conflict in the current era, we must point out the first roots of this conflict, which began in the first period of the emergence of Islam and the major events that occurred at that time between Muslims and Jews, which were mainly represented by the tribes of BanuQurayda, Banu al-Nazir, and BanuQaynuqa, and the betrayals that accompanied them. There was treachery within the Islamic community at that time, which has continued to increase until the present time, but we will address this conflict in its historical context between Arabs and Israelis through the Palestinian issue and the various connotations it reflects about this conflict.

1.1- The Roots of the Palestinian Issue

1.1.1.Zionist Movement and Jewish Immigration:

The Zionist movement in Palestine is a complex and multifaceted issue in history, characterized by complex dynamics of ideology, conflict, and negotiation. This idea arose in the late nineteenth century and aimed to create a Jewish homeland in the region that had been under Ottoman rule. This chapter explores the development of Zionism in Palestine, tracing its roots, key figures, and complex interactions with the indigenous Arab population.

Theodor Herzl, a Viennese journalist, was the founder and driving force behind "political Zionism." Initially an assimilated Jew without a Jewish education and little interest in Jewish affairs, Herzl's perspective changed in 1893 when Karl Lueger was elected mayor of Vienna in an anti-establishment election. His concerns deepened the following year while covering the trial of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in the French army wrongly convicted of treason. Amidst widespread anti-Semitism, Herzl became convinced that Jews would never be fully accepted and concluded that the solution to the "Jewish question" was to create a state. Jewish. In his influential book The State of the Jews, Herzl argued that the Jewish problem in Europe needed to be recognized and addressed as an international political issue. This idea has been nourished over time to become a belief among all Jews to unite and search for an alternative homeland that includes the entire spectrum of Jews and the global Zionist movement. Unfortunately, this was at the expense of the Palestinian territories, which is what we observe today through the settlement operations and organized migration to the Palestinian territories in an organized manner and under the watchful eye of the world and the Security Council.(Edwerd tivnan,p54)

The goal of Theodor Herzl's Zionism was to rescue Jews from their alien status in the world and restore their "normalcy" within a Jewish state. Herzl believed that if global hostility toward Jews was a natural phenomenon, Zionism could remove the provocation by establishing a Jewish nation, thereby acting as Europe's "peacemaker." Historian Arthur Hertzberg noted that earlier Zionist thinkers had revolutionized Jewish thought by suggesting that the critical dialogue was not between Jews and God but between Jews and the world. They replaced the central tenet of Judaism—the coming of a Messiah—with Zionism, which promised Jews political liberty, economic and social justice akin to what 19th-century

progressives promised the rest of the world. Herzl added this idea to the various national movements envisioned by 19th-century European political thinkers.(Tivan,p55)

In August of 1897, the inaugural Zionist Congress convened in the Swiss town of Basle, presided over by Theodore Herzl, a vibrant and ambitious Austro-Hungarian journalist. This historic event marked a significant juncture in both modern Jewish and Middle Eastern history. The congress articulated the central tenet of Zionism: the establishment of a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, to be secured through legal means. Furthermore, it laid the groundwork for institutions aimed at advancing this objective. By the onset of the First World War in 1914, the Jewish community in Palestine, commonly referred to as the Yishuv, had swelled to between 85,000 and 100,000 individuals, comprising nearly 15 percent of the region's total population

Dr. Chaim Weizmann, leader of the Zionist Movement, endorsed the provision of comprehensive assurances to implement the British Government's Declaration of November 2nd, 1917. He also advocated for the adoption of all essential measures to foster and bolster the immigration of Jews into Palestine on a significant scale.(karsh, p. 13)

Jewish immigration to Palestine saw many suspicious activities aimed at obtaining as much land as possible, in response to the Arab riots of 1929. Another White Paper called for stricter restrictions on immigration and land sales to Jews, although the Prime Minister abandoned these recommendations quickly.

1.1-2 Origins and ideology:

The Zionist movement emerged in response to the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe, where Jews faced discrimination, violence, and persecution. Theodor Herzl, often viewed as the father of modern political Zionism, expressed the need for a Jewish state in his seminal work The Jewish State (1896). Herzl believed that Palestine was the ideal location for this country due to its historical importance and religious symbolism for the Jews.

1.1-3 the Balfour Declaration :

The declaration of the State of Palestine was the culmination of Zionist efforts to secure support for their goals, which had been announced some twenty years earlier at the First Zionist Congress in 1897.(3cliford A. wright,P156)

In 1917, the Balfour Declaration issued by the British Foreign Secretary expressed the British government's commitment to establishing a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine. By 1937, the British realized that the only solution was surgical separation of the two communities, when the Peel Royal Commission recommended the division of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.(T. Kapitan,pp1-58)

As awareness of the Balfour Declaration spread, Palestinian opposition to Zionism took shape through organized political means. The inaugural Palestinian Congress in 1919 issued a manifesto rejecting Zionist territorial claims and strongly criticizing the Balfour Declaration. Concerns among Arabs were heightened by Zionist assertions equating the declaration with the establishment of a Jewish state, particularly underscored by Weizmann's stated aim during the 1919

Paris Peace Conference for "Palestine to become as Jewish as England is English." Palestinians, including Darwaza, initially leaned towards advocating for union within "greater Syria" as a response, but this option waned by 1920 due to French dominance over Syria and Lebanon as per the British-French agreements of 1916. Consequently, the Palestinian national movement found itself increasingly isolated from similar independence movements elsewhere in the Arab world.

1.1.4- The 1948 Palestine War :

The 1948 Palestine War was a complex conflict with multiple participants. The Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine, which later became the State of Israel, confronted three primary opponents: Palestinian Arabs, a pan-Arab volunteer force, and the regular armed forces of six Arab states. Moreover, Britain, as the governing power until mid-May 1948, had a substantial military presence, influencing the course of the conflict. The withdrawal of British forces affected strategic planning, and their naval blockade hindered the Jewish community's war effort by limiting refugee arrivals and access to weapons.

As the largest and most populous Arab country, Egypt had the most extensive military establishment. Supplied and trained by Britain, the Egyptian armed forces trebled their order of battle in the wake of the Second World War to 35,00&45,000 troops. The ground forces consisted of three infantry brigades, one tank brigade (with some 50 tanks) and three artillery battalions armed with 65 Howitzer guns, while the air force comprised five squadrons of 18 fighting aircraft each and one transport squadron.

1.2. The most important stages of the Arab-Israeli conflict:

Firstly, there has been a longstanding conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours: Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon—as well as the broader Arab world, concerning Israel's sovereignty and territorial integrity since its independence in May 1948. This conflict has led to a series of conventional wars, including the First Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49, the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1967-70 War of Attrition, the 1973 October War (also known as Yom Kippur War), and the 1982 Israel-Lebanon War.(A. Siniver,pp1-10)

1.2.1-Suez Crisis1956 (Sinai Campaign):

Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal prompted a joint invasion by Israel, France, and the UK. Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, but international pressure, particularly from the US and USSR, forced a withdrawal, highlighting the Cold War's influence on the region.

Before the crisis peaked in late 1956, the British and Americans explored different strategies to subdue Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. U.S. President Eisenhower aimed to counter Nasser through Operation Omega, a covert initiative using diplomacy and secret actions to undermine his influence in the Arab world. Conversely, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who succeeded Churchill in 1955, preferred a more aggressive approach. Working with the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Eden planned either to assassinate Nasser or launch a large-scale invasion. Eden, likening Nasser to Hitler, argued for immediate action. In correspondence with Eisenhower and discussions with the SIS, Eden frequently compared Nasser to Hitler and Mussolini. He firmly believed that appeasement

would be futile, a stance influenced by his resignation as foreign secretary in 1938 over dissatisfaction with Britain's appeasement of Nazi Germany before World War II .(Ma Xiaoqi,pp56-64)

1.2-2 -1967 Six-Day War:

In the historiography of the 1967 War, it is commonly depicted as an "inadvertent war." However, this article, using recently declassified documents, offers an alternative interpretation. It critically examines existing theories and shows that the United Arab Republic's (UAR) military actions were limited in scope and lacked aggressive intentions. Israel's decision to strike was motivated not by military necessity but to prevent a diplomatic solution that might have been unfavourable to Israel. While the historiography of U.S. involvement in the Middle East is debated, it is widely agreed that 1967 was a pivotal year in the post-World War II history of the region. The Six-Day War in June 1967 led to profound changes, establishing Israel as a major regional power, altering the strategic landscape of the Middle East, and intensifying superpower tensions in the region. Israel launched pre-emptive strikes against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Within six days, Israel captured the Gaza Strip, West Bank, East Jerusalem, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights. This war dramatically changed the regional map and intensified the conflict.(R. Popp, pp281-309)

1.2.3- October War 1973:

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War occurred shortly after the United States withdrew its ground forces from Vietnam and arranged for the return of its prisoners from North Vietnam. Traditionally, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has been superior in past conflicts and has recently been strengthened by American aircraft and technology. However, the October 1973 War presented Israel with great challenges. Arab forces used new missile strategies and technologies, causing significant losses to Israel in the first days. The Israeli Air Force, which was not prepared for ground-based missile defences, was severely affected by the Soviet SA-2, SA-3, SA-7 and SA-6 missiles. In addition, Israeli armoured units suffered heavy damage from light wire-guided anti-tank missiles deployed by the Arabs. The unexpected effectiveness of these Arab missile technologies led to widespread concern and a re-evaluation of military tactics.(R. Author,pp30-34)

Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel during Yom Kippur. After initial setbacks, Israel regained its positions. The war led to the Camp David Accords and eventually the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, the first peace agreement between Israel and an Arab country.

1.2.4- 1982 Lebanon War:

Israel invaded southern Lebanon to expel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) forces. This led to a prolonged military presence in Lebanon and significant casualties on all sides.Israel claimed that it attacked, not Lebanon, but the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon in order to put the Galilee region of Israel out of the range of enemy artillery. The facts are that Israel invaded Lebanon on 6 June 1982 inorder to totally destroy the PLO, not only its insignificant military capability but also all its civilian functions. The other basic war aim was described by Israeli Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon: 'The bigger the

blow and the more we damage the PLO infrastruc- ture, the more the Arabs in Judea and Samaria [the Biblical name for the West Bank used by Israel] and Gaza will be ready to negotiate with us' .(cliford A. wright,p133)

1.2.5- 1987-1993 First Intifada:

Palestinian uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip against Israeli occupation. The Intifada increased international awareness of the Palestinian cause and set the stage for the Oslo Accords.

Palestinian agitation continued to grow in the occupied territories following the PLO's expulsion from Beirut, exacerbated by ongoing efforts to marginalize the national movement. By December 1987, Israel's two-decade control over these territories had become intolerable, leading to spontaneous protests in the Gaza Strip that quickly spread to the West Bank. This marked the beginning of the first Intifada ("shaking off"), highlighting that Israel's treatment of Palestinians could no longer be ignored. Predominantly a nonviolent uprising characterized by mass strikes and civil disobedience, it was met with harsh measures by Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who publicly endorsed "a policy of beatings and breaking of bones." Soon, images of brutal Israeli beatings of Palestinian youths became a regular feature on American evening television news.(S. Anziska,pp1-23)

1.2.6-Oslo Accords1993:

A series of agreements between Israel and the PLO aimed at achieving a peace process and the establishment of Palestinian self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. While significant, the accords did not result in a lasting peace.
The resulting Oslo Accords, which were signed on the south lawn of the White House on September 13, 1993, were considered a breakthrough in the Israeli−Palestinian conflict. William Jefferson Clinton, the former governor from Arkansas who had developed close ties with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, invited the parties to the Washington signing. Rabin famously shook hands with Yasser Arafat as their deputies signed the Declaration of Principles, and a beaming Clinton burnished his own reputation as a skillful diplomat and broker in the Arab–Israeli arena. In the words of Vice President Albert Gore, this convergence was "the closest we have with any of our friends and allies anywhere in the world.(S. Anziska,pp1-23)

1.2.7-Second Intifada 2000-2005:

A more violent Palestinian uprising triggered by tensions and a visit by Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount. It resulted in heavy casualties and further deteriorated Israeli-Palestinian relations.

the second intifada broke out in 2000. In contrast to the first spurt, it had a much more dramatic course. For the Jewish state and its citizens, suicide bombings had particularly severe consequences. Reinforced security measures and, in a sense, the construction of a wall separating the areas inhabited by Palestinians on Jewish settlements eliminated this type of danger. he effects of rocket attacks from the Hamas-dominated Gaza Strip were minimized by the construction of a missile defense shield (Iron Dome) and the reprisals taken by the Israeli military.(A. L. Licznerska and A. L. Licznerska,2020)

1.2.8 Gaza Disengagement 2005:

In 2003, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon proposed the disengagement plan, which was adopted by the government in June 2004 and approved by the Knesset in February 2005 as the Disengagement Plan Implementation Law. The plan aimed to isolate Gaza and reduce international pressure on Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians. Implemented in August 2005 and completed by September 2005, the plan saw Israeli security forces evict settlers who refused compensation and did not voluntarily leave by the August 15 deadline. By September 12, all Israeli residents and associated security personnel were removed from the Gaza Strip, and the demolition of residential buildings was completed. The dismantling of four settlements in the northern West Bank was finished ten days later, relocating over 8,000 Jewish settlers from 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip.

1.2.9-2006 Lebanon War:

Triggered by Hezbollah's cross-border raid and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, this conflict saw extensive fighting between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, leading to significant destruction in Lebanon and northern Israel.

1.2.10 The Lebanon War2006,

Also called the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War and known in Lebanon as the July War (Arabic: July War, ḤarbTammūz) and in Israel as the Second Lebanon War MilhemetLevanonHaShniya), was a 34-day military conflict in Lebanon, northern Israel and the Golan Heights. The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The conflict started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the morning on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon. Due to unprecedented Iranian military support to Hezbollah before and during the war, some consider it the first round of the Iran–Israel proxy conflict, rather than a continuation of the Arab–Israeli conflict.

1.2-11-Gaza War2014:

A major conflict between Israel and Hamas, marked by intense fighting and significant casualties. It was part of a series of periodic escalations between Israel and militant groups in Gaza. These events reflect the ongoing and complex nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with deep-seated historical, political, and social roots influencing the region's dynamics.

1.3- The American sponsorship of the peace process
1.3.1- Camp David

The 1973 War reversed the American view of Arab- Israeli peace as an American interest. Before the war, peace was not seen as an urgent strategic interest of the United States. U.S. security was played out on an international playing field dominated by the two superpowers— the United States and the Soviet Union.

However, after the 1973 War, American policymakers began to see the high costs and risks of not having peace. The ongoing conflict with the Soviet Union challenged the policy of détente, and the Arab oil embargo, which happened

because the U.S. decided to resupply the Israeli military during the war, had serious economic impacts. Additionally, it became clear that ensuring Israel's security was becoming more complicated.These factors led American policymakers to understand the urgency of achieving peace between Arabs and Israelis, as it was closely tied to important American interests (Quandt, 4). American policymakers realized they had to balance two potentially conflicting interests: appealing to Arab leaders to ensure a steady flow of oil at reasonable prices and maintaining the security of Israel. From this point on, it became a fundamental belief in American foreign policy that pursuing Arab-Israeli peace was in the national interest of the United States. Persistent Arab-Israeli conflict would force the U.S. to make difficult choices, highlighting the importance of striving for peace in the region.

In the same context, Yaqub argue that the failed diplomacy began under President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. Instead of working for a comprehensive peace agreement that compelled Israel to withdraw from all Arab land seized in 1967, and to address the future status of the Palestinians, Nixon and Kissinger accepted the stalemate in the region. Nixon realized not only that alienating Israel and its American supporters "carried great political risks" (Yaqub. 21), but also that a stalemate in the region allowed him the flexibility to pursue his larger foreign policy objectives (i.e., detente ´ with the Soviet Union and ending the Vietnam War). Kissinger, meanwhile, viewed the Arab–Israeli conflict strictly through a Cold War lens, which led him to lean overwhelmingly toward Israel at the expense of the Arabs. Because Egypt and Syria were Soviet allies, he believed it was a mistake for Washington to help either country regain territory by pressuring Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories. Better, in his mind, to delay any settlement until the Arab leaders had reduced their ties with the Kremlin and reoriented their nations to the United States (Daigle, p758)

According to SalimYaqub's and James Stocker's, failed diplomacy in the Middle East began during President Richard Nixon's time, with his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. Instead of pushing for a comprehensive peace deal that would require Israel to give back all Arab land taken in 1967 and address Palestinian issues, Nixon and Kissinger accepted the ongoing conflict. Nixon knew that upsetting Israel and its American supporters was politically risky and that maintaining the stalemate gave him the flexibility to focus on his broader foreign policy goals, like détente with the Soviet Union and ending the Vietnam War (Yaqub. 21). Kissinger, on the other hand, saw the Arab-Israeli conflict mainly in the context of the Cold War, which made him strongly favor Israel over the Arab countries. Since Egypt and Syria were allied with the Soviet Union, Kissinger thought it was a mistake for the U.S. to help them regain territory by pressuring Israel to withdraw. He believed it was better to wait for the Arab leaders to weaken their ties with the Soviet Union and move closer to the U.S. (Daigle, 758).

The diplomacy after 1973 caused several problems for American policy. First, despite Kissinger's efforts, he didn't fully resolve the 1973 crisis and only managed to secure limited agreements. Second, to finalize the 1975 Israel-Egypt

Sinai II agreement, the U.S. promised not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it recognized Israel's right to exist and accepted UN Resolution 242. This issue of Palestinian representation troubled American diplomacy for over a decade. The U.S. also promised to closely coordinate peace strategies with Israel but didn't make the same promise to the Arabs. While the U.S. gave some assurances to Egypt, mainly in terms of aid, it largely sided with Israel in coordinating peace strategies(Quandt, p5). This imbalance made it harder to make progress in the peace process in the following years.

This phase of diplomacy introduced two key ideas for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that shaped efforts for the next several decades. The first idea was about making gradual and temporary arrangements. The Camp David agreements in 1978 were based on the theory that the parties involved could start with smaller, interim agreements on various issues, as final issues like borders, security, Jerusalem, and refugees were too complex to solve right away. U.S. officials believed that by implementing these smaller agreements, trust would be built to eventually address the harder issues. However, the true reason for proposing a five-year transition was less about building trust and more about waiting for a time when Israel might have a prime minister less stubborn about the occupied territories.

The idea of making gradual, step-by-step peace agreements never worked out in practice. The negotiations for Palestinian autonomy after Camp David were less important compared to the immediate task of implementing the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. These negotiations, along with later efforts like Secretary of State George P. Shultz's 1988 initiative, failed because of mistrust and weak support from the U.S. when the parties rejected the proposals. Instead of building trust, this approach often reduced confidence as the parties didn't follow through on agreements or meet their obligations. The success of the first Camp David process started a flawed concept that would trouble peace efforts for many years.

The second major idea in American policy during this time was to push for peace without involving the PLO, which Israel wouldn't accept as a partner. At the 1978 Camp David talks and the following autonomy negotiations, Egypt tried to represent Palestinian interests, sometimes taking tougher positions than the Palestinians themselves. However, Egypt couldn't replace Palestinians in the negotiations (Quandt, 8). The U.S. and Israel thought Jordan would be a better peace partner for Israel, viewing the Palestinians as less important, despite the United Nations recognizing the PLO as the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

1.3.2- The Oslo Accords :

A major U.S. breakthrough in Middle East peace efforts happened in 1991 with the Madrid Peace Conference. Significant changes in the international, regional, and local Middle East environments, along with committed leaders and determined American diplomacy, created a perfect opportunity for success. The end of the Cold War shifted the global landscape from Soviet-American rivalry to a U.S.-dominated context where the U.S. and Russia could work together to

resolve conflicts. The 1991 Gulf War saw remarkable events, including the impressive display of American military power, the successful international coalition against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the willingness of key Arab states, like Egypt and Syria, to join the coalition and fight alongside Western armies against an Arab country. Locally, the Palestinian Intifada that began in late 1987 broke the illusion that Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza could continue indefinitely without significant costs. Additionally, new local leaders emerged, including a local Islamist group that would become Hamas, giving the Palestinian community new voices alongside the PLO in representing their interests.

When the U.S. began working towards the Madrid Peace Conference in the spring of 1991, their goals were not clearly defined and were more tactical than strategic. Baker believed that a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations could take advantage of global and regional changes, but his approach was about getting the parties to agree on as much as possible. He drew heavily from past U.S. peace efforts, like the 1978 Camp David Accords, the 1982 Reagan Plan, and the 1988 Shultz initiative. Baker's plan included confidence-building measures between Israel and the Arabs, an international conference to show support from major powers and the UN, bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbours (the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon), and multilateral negotiations to address regional issues and involve key Arab countries like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and Maghreb states.

The Madrid Process, initiated to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, had several unexpected outcomes. Perhaps the most significant was the breakthrough in relations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993. After years of intense hostility, Israel and the PLO engaged in months of secret diplomacy facilitated by the Norwegian government. This culminated in mutual recognition and the signing of a Declaration of Principles, collectively known as the Oslo Accords, on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993.

American diplomacy played a crucial role in opening the door to substantive negotiations and political contacts during the Madrid Conference. However, it did not participate in the secret Israeli-PLO talks, instead serving as the host for the signing ceremony of the Oslo Accords.

At the time, the Oslo Accords were seen as a critical step towards peace. They eliminated artificial barriers over who should represent the Palestinians and addressed concerns that previous processes had excluded the PLO, recognized by Arab states and Palestinians as the "sole, legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. From then on, direct, face-to-face diplomacy was established between Israel and the PLO, marking a significant shift in the approach to resolving the conflict.

The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, signed by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), marked, theoritically, a significant step toward resolving decades of conflict. This agreement acknowledged each party's legitimate political rights and their mutual desire for peaceful coexistence with dignity and security. Both sides committed to

continuing the political process to achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement.

A closer examination of the Oslo Accords reveals key provisions that are critical to understanding the agreement's intent and implications. Notably, Article IV specifies that the jurisdiction of the interim self-government would cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip, viewing them as a single territorial unit whose integrity would be preserved during the interim period. Article V established a five-year transitional period beginning with the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and Jericho, with permanent status negotiations starting no later than the third year of this period.

On May 4, 1994, the agreement on "the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area" was signed in Cairo by the PLO and the Israeli government. The preamble emphasized that these interim arrangements were integral to the overall peace process and that negotiations on permanent status would aim to implement United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 242 and 338. Article II of this agreement called for a scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Gaza and Jericho, which began immediately after the signing. The Palestinian Authority was then established, holding legislative, executive, and judicial powers in areas from which Israeli forces withdrew.

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, known as "Oslo II," was signed on September 28, 1995, in Washington, D.C. The preamble reaffirmed both sides' commitment to peace and recognized the peace process and the new relationship as irreversible. It also reiterated their determination to sustain and advance the peace process, aiming for a permanent settlement based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. According to Chapter 2, Annex XI of the agreement, the West Bank and Gaza Strip were to come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner over 18 months, with gradual Israeli force redeployment.

Five redeployment phases were planned: the first on September 28, 1995; the second on November 20, 1998; the third on September 4, 1999; and the fourth and fifth on January 4 and March 20, 2000. However, the agreed redeployment was never fully realized. Consequently, only 39% of the West Bank (Areas A and B) came under partial Palestinian Authority jurisdiction. This territory is fragmented into noncontiguous enclaves surrounded by a contiguous Israeli-controlled Area C, which comprises 61% of the West Bank and was to be gradually transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction. As of 2022, Area C remains under Israeli control, hindering Palestinian development contrary to the Oslo II agreement.

While peace-building efforts and Israeli force redeployment were intended, successive Israeli governments continued to transfer civilians into illegal settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The settler population, which was just over a quarter-million in 1993, surged to approximately 700,000 by 2022. This growth has been systematic and unceasing, reinforcing Israel's control over Palestinian territories and natural resources.

The continued expansion of illegal settlements and Israel's control over the West Bank and its resources are primary reasons the redeployment was never fully implemented. These actions have significantly undermined peace-building attempts and efforts to achieve a peace settlement, casting doubt on the viability of a two-state solution as a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

1.4 - The foundation of the American policy toward the Arab Israeli conflict:

The main trend in the history of American foreign policy since the American Revolution has been the shift from a policy of non-intervention before and after World War I, to its growth in global power and dominance during World War II and the end of the Cold War in the twentieth century. American foreign policy since the nineteenth century has been characterized by a shift from the theoretical school of political realism to the idealistic or Wilsonian school of international relations.

George Washington expressed foreign policy themes largely in his farewell letter, which dealt, among other things, with showing good faith and justice toward all nations, encouraging peace and harmony with all, excluding "inveterate hatred toward certain nations, and sympathy with others," and "Avoid permanent alliances with any part of the outside world," and called for trade with all countries. These policies became the basis of the American Federalist Party in the 1790s, but rival Jeffersonians feared Britain and favoured France in the 1790s, and declared war on Britain in 1812. After the 1778 alliance with France, the United States did not sign a permanent treaty Others until 1949, when they signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Over time, presidential policies have expressed a variety of other themes, goals, actions, or positions through various means. They were not common events at first, but since World War II, most presidents have adopted them.

Therefore ,before examining the evolution and transformation of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, it is crucial to first frame and contextualize its complex origins. U.S. interests in the region date back to the nineteenth century, marked by the spread of American missionary movements in countries like Egypt and Turkey. However, the United States began to play a more significant and influential role in the Middle East only after the end of the Second World War.

1.4.1- American Foreign Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict:

U.S. foreign policy towards the Palestinian cause has fluctuated over time, influenced by different presidents and periods. This policy significantly impacts the peace process in the region. Tensions have increased since the U.S. relegated the Palestinian issue to a secondary priority. Regardless of its level of involvement,

the U.S. continues to play a crucial and influential role in promoting peace, security, and stability in the Middle East.(O. A. Hamdi,,251-271)

U.S. views Israel as a strategic base for its interests, with mutual benefits underpinning America's support for Israel. Israel serves as a military, cultural, and security asset for the U.S., costing less to maintain than deploying 10 aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean and Red Sea to safeguard American interests. Consequently, U.S. and Israeli strategic planning are closely interconnected. The U.S. believes that Israel's safety and security ensure regional stability and protect U.S. interests. This raises questions about the nature of shifts in U.S. foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite changes in administration, these shifts reveal a consistent U.S. stance on issues such as refugees, Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

1.4.2- The global role of usa as a superpower :

The United States is considered the most prominent superpower in the world since the end of World War II. There are several factors that contributed to strengthening this situation such asEconomic power: The United States has the largest economy in the world, which gives it a great ability to influence global markets and determine international economic policies, in addition to the fact that the United States The first military power, it has the largest defence budget in the world, and has advanced armed forces whose bases are spread all over the world. This military capability enables it to intervene in international crises quickly and effectively without forgetting technological and scientific superiority. It leads the world in the fields of innovation, technology and scientific research, with the presence of a large number of world-leading universities and research institutions. It is also considered a political system built on democracy that contributes to the formation of policies. It is relatively stable and maintains its ability to have diplomatic influence on the international scene. Finally, cultural strength can be mentioned. American culture has a great influence through cinema, music, and technology (such as the Internet and social media), which contribute to spreading American values and culture globally.

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, its disintegration, and the successive birth of the Russian Federation (referred to in this book as Russia) ledmost scholars and experts to agree that a unipolar international system had emerged, with the USA being the sole superpower of the world.(B. Prifti,p12)

1.4.3- The interests of the USA in the region and its relationships with Israel and some Arab states:

Energy Security:

The term "petrostate" is often used in an abstract way, applying to nations that differ greatly in every way—political systems, social organization, economy, culture, religion, and population—except for one thing: they all export oil and natural gas. . However, some common features make oil country a useful lens.

The Biden administration released its National Security Strategy on Wednesday, October 12, with President Biden declaring that "conquering China and reining in Russia," with a focus on restoring declining democracy at home,

will represent the United States' greatest challenge in the years ahead. The strategy also indicated that these challenges would be met through investment at home, modernizing the army, and building an alliance with countries with similar trends.

The United States' national security strategy is often the subject of intense analysis by foreign policy analysts outside and within the United States. But it should be noted here that the main audience for this strategy is the domestic audience, which is not at all interested in foreign affairs, and so when it develops the strategy, we find it mostly focusing on perceptions of the real or potential external threat. Therefore, it is noted that the strategies in this document are always vague, rhetorical, inaccurate, and based on threats only and pointing to opportunities at times. Energy security is considered among the most important concerns of the United States in the Middle East region, especially the Gulf states, which allows Israeli national security to remain The chances of the United States' influence and the survival of its economic interests depend on the survival and security of Israel.

In 1974, Freeman led a $4 million Ford Foundation study published as A Time to Choose. Drawing on research from a base of interdisciplinary scholars, the report framed the energy crisis as a moral crossroads for the nation. It concluded that the nation could shrink its demand for energy and achieve energy security while strengthening the environment and maintaining a high standard of living. Through a national commitment to conservation and energy efficiency the United States could solve its energy problems once and for all.(JohnDavid and B. A. Dissertation,p91)

Counterterrorism:

One of the earliest significant stories in Israeli counterterrorism involves preventing potential terrorism in 1949. After the establishment of Israel, many Palestinians found themselves as strangers in a familiar land, with over 700,000 becoming refugees and about 150,000 remaining in Israel, many of whom were internal refugees separated from their homes. While attention often focuses on those who fled or were expelled, the Palestinians who stayed in Israel experienced far less violent conflict with Jews after the 1947-49 wars. These Israeli Arabs generally did not act as a fifth column in subsequent Arab-Israeli wars, and only a few supported Palestinian militant groups.

An analysis of US foreign policy leading up to the 2003 Iraq War reveals significant similarities to Cold War strategies. Both were influenced by similar factors, goals and strategies, with the main new element being the war against state-sponsored terrorism. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States emerged as the dominant global power, but by the early 2000s, new competitors had emerged, including Iraq in the Middle East. Iraq's actions, such as the 1980 invasion of Iran, use of chemical weapons, 1989 invasion of Kuwait, support of anti-American terrorist organizations, and challenge of American influence, posed a significant threat to regional stability and American interests. The United States responded to this threat by invading Iraq in 2003.(.B..Prifti,P108)

Finally, we can say that despite the pretexts and justifications that the United States established for invading Iraq under the pretext of combating terrorism, it

was in fact a clear reason for the emergence of global terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS.

Support for Allies:

Many analysts believe that the United States' support for its allies in the Middle East depends on the security and stability of Israel on the one hand and on the size of the concessions it makes to advance normalization on the other hand. In return, these countries obtain economic, political and military privileges, and at the forefront of these countries is Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, in addition to other smaller countries, such as Bahrain, for example.

1.4.4- The role of Jewish lobby :

The Israel lobby are individuals and groups seeking to influence the United States government to better serve Israel's interests. The largest pro-Israel lobbying group is Christians United for Israel with over seven million members.(Tivan,p145)

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is a leading organization within the lobby, speaking on behalf of a coalition of pro-Israel American Jewish groups.Zionist pressure was so organized and effective that the columnistDrew Pearson reported that 'President Truman cracked down harder on his State Department than ever before to swing the United Nations' vote for the partition of Palestine.'ll Truman's belief that Israel would serve American interests in the region explains the spectacular success of the Zionist lobbying efforts.

Edward Tivnan goes In his book"jewishpoliticalpowerandAmericanforeign policy "To give a detailed historical account of the emergence of the Jewish lobby in the United States of America and its effects on American policy.

Before Israel existed as a state, it began as a political lobby, first in European capitals and later in Washington. Zionism was the romantic vision of a group of nineteenth-century European ideologues who shared a single core belief: that Jews needed a "Jewish state" to live a "normal" life in an anti-Semitic world. Zionist leaders tirelessly campaigned to gain international support for this vision, often facing hostility and skepticism. Among their most significant doubters and critics were Jewish leaders in America.

We will discuss the most important factors that explain the extent of the Zionist lobby's influence on American policy in its various forms and its relationship with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

a. American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC):

It is an enthusiastic pressure group that encourages the United States and has the American authorities and executives. One of several pro-Israel organizations in the United States, AIPAC says it has more than 100,000 members and 17 offices in high demand from donors. In addition, the organization widely known in the United States is one of the most influential groups in the world.

In July 1984, Bob Asher, a Chicago businessman who had justbeen elected president of AIPAC, addressed the annual policy confer- ence—the twenty-fifth—and declared that his dream for the only Jewish group registered in Washington as a lobbyist for Israel was 250,000 members, Jews and non-Jews. He and Tom Dine were eager to make AIPAC into the preeminent Jewish organization in America.

AIPAC's 1985 budget was $3 million. (Edwerd tivan,p54)

b- Some aspects of the influence of the Jewish lobby on American government policy:

In this element, we will focus on the most important aspects briefly.

Legislation:

The Jewish lobby, prominently represented by organizations like AIPAC and J Street, wields considerable influence over the U.S. legislative process. Through robust lobbying efforts, political donations, and public diplomacy, these groups advocate for pro-Israel policies and secure significant military aid, including the annual $3.8 billion package to Israel. They strive to maintain bipartisan support for Israel-related legislation, promote sanctions against adversaries such as Iran, and foster peace agreements in the Middle East. By mobilizing community backing and supplying policymakers with detailed research and policy analysis, the Jewish lobby significantly shapes U.S. foreign policy and legislative priorities regarding Israel.

Diplomatic Efforts:

Encouraging the U.S. to use its influence in international organizations to support Israel, including vetoing UN resolutions perceived as biased against Israel. In many stages of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the United States of America has often sought to use diplomatic efforts to curb Arab supremacy, such as what happened in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War or the negotiations that took place in Oslo under the leadership of Yasser Arafat (against the backdrop of diplomatic efforts led (or supported) by the United States Washington's financial and military support for Israel - along with Tel Aviv's involvement in settlement expansion in the West Bank - only serves to further underscore the fact that the "peace process" has been reached on the political stage.[15Gregory Harm,p160]

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Public Diplomacy and Education: Organizations undertake public education campaigns to foster a positive perception of Israel and to inform both the American public and policymakers about the significance of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

1.4.5- The instrumentalization of UN security council:

On October 24, 1945, with the deposit of the necessary 29 ratifications, including those of the five major powers, the Charter of the United Nations Organization came into force. The essential question everywhere raised is whether, in the light of the wide range of current international controversies and the terrifying development of weapons of aggression, such as the atomic bomb, the Charter will effectively fulfil its objectives of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation.(Alfred P . Fernbach,pp114-146)

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations, charged with ensuring international peace and security, accepting new members to the United Nations, and approving any changes to the UN Charter. Its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the imposition of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action through resolutions

Structure and Membership :

The UN Security Council consists of 15 members, including 10 non-permanent members who are elected by the General Assembly, which represents all 193 member states of the United Nations. The other five permanent members of the Council are the United Kingdom, China, the United States of America, France and Russia.

Functions and Powers:

Under the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council has the following functions and powers:

-Maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

-Investigate any dispute or situation that may lead to an international dispute.

 -Make recommendations on the settlement of such disputes or on the terms of settlement

-Develop plans to establish a system to regulate armaments.

Identify any threat to the peace or act of aggression, and make recommendations on the actions that should be taken.

Calling on all members to apply economic sanctions and other measures that do not entail the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;

Take military measures against the aggressor.

Recommending the admission of new members.

Carrying out United Nations trusteeship functions in "strategic locations".

Submitting recommendations to the General Assembly regarding the election of the Secretary-General, and the election, together with the Assembly, of the judges of the International Tribunal.

The major task of the Security Council is to ensure the peaceful settlement of international disputes, as outlined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Article 1, Paragraph 1, states that the United Nations aims to adjust or settle international disputes by peaceful means and in line with justice and international law. Article 2, Paragraph 3, requires all members to resolve their disputes peacefully to avoid endangering international peace, security, and justice. While members are not obligated to settle all disputes, they must use peaceful methods and adhere to justice and international law.(Alfred P . Fernbach,p134)

The Security Council has intended to issue many resolutions regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict since the Nakba War of 1948, but most of them remain news on paper due to the control of the great powers in directing UN Security Council resolutions in favor of Israel, which failed to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, it became a means to protect Israel through the use of Veto power from the United States of America. Perhaps the October 7 war is the best evidence

of the Security Council's inability to adhere to international laws to protect civilians and punish perpetrators, despite the International Court of Justice issuing its decisions to stop the war and protect civilians, which reached the level of genocide, which makes us ask many questions about the Council's credibility.

- **The American veto and its role in protecting Israel:**

The veto power helped the United States to provide the best political support to the Israeli entity by thwarting the issuance of any Security Council resolution obligating "Israel" to stop the occupation of Palestinian lands and acts of violence against the Palestinian people, or thwarting any resolution condemning "Israel" for using excessive force, and this is based on The stages of the Arab-Israeli conflict have passed, and perhaps the last veto of the United States was against Algeria's decision to stop the war on Gaza, which was approved by all the countries of the Security Council except the United States and Britain's abstention. This is despite the issuance of the International Court of Justice's decision to stop the war and protect civilians. Algeria confirmed through its whistle in Ankara that The new setback that the world witnessed once again yesterday, Tuesday, February 20, 2024, at the UN Security Council, following the United States' use of its "veto" in the face of stopping a genocide that is the most dangerous in the history of occupied Palestine, will not diminish its resolve to return again and again and knock on the Council's door until it assumes its responsibilities and demands With a ceasefire in Gaza, which I did by submitting a new project to stop the killing of civilians in Rafah.

In this first chapter, we have discussed the historical context of the Arab-Israeli conflict since the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 up to the Nakba War of 1948, and the most important stages of the Arab-Israeli conflict through various wars. We have also addressed the role of American diplomacy and the role of the Zionist lobby in the direction of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a superpower that dominates Security Council resolutions and directs it however it wishes. The latter, whose role we touched upon in protecting Israel by not using the veto. Finally, we touched on the double standards and the destruction of human values and international laws of what are known as human rights through the genocide to which the Palestinian people are exposed in the Gaza Strip.

Chapter Two:

The Abraham Accords : Motives and implications

2.The Abraham Accords : Motives and implications

In September 2020, normalization agreements known as the Abraham Accords were signed at the White House, officially establishing ties between Israel, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Following suit, Morocco signed an agreement of mutual recognition with Israel in December 2020. Although Sudan announced in October 2020 that it would establish diplomatic relations with Israel, a final peace agreement has not yet been signed.

2.1. The Abraham Accords Driving Factors

2.1.1- Geopolitical Context and U.S. Disengagement

The Abraham Accords emerged within a complex geopolitical landscape characterized by significant changes in the Middle East. One of the main factors influencing these accords was the perception among regional powers, particularly the Gulf monarchies, that the United States was shifting its focus towards Asia. This strategic shift, known as the "pivot to Asia" began during President Obama's administration and has continued as a bipartisan agenda. The Gulf monarchies interpreted this shift as a reduction in the guarantees of American protection (Sofinzon, 2023). Although the U.S. maintains a substantial military presence in the Middle East, its political engagement has diminished, leaving a strategic vacuum. This disengagement was particularly evident in 2013 when President Obama chose not to intervene in Syria after the Assad regime used chemical weapons. The 2021 withdrawal from Kabul further underscores this trend of American non-intervention.

Several factors contribute to this American trend. One is the failure of nation-building projects, coupled with public fatigue over the protracted conflicts in the Middle East, especially following the controversial 2003 Iraq War. Another factor is the U.S. move towards energy self-sufficiency, beginning in 2009, which has altered its relationship with oil-exporting countries. Additionally, the strategic concept of "leading from behind" adopted during Obama's presidency (Carafano, 2015), and the renewed great power rivalry with China and Russia, have further redirected American focus away from the Middle East. The Abraham Accords reflect a geopolitical reconfiguration in response to America's strategic shift.

2.1.2- Regional Instability and Shared Threats

Another crucial factor was the instability caused by the 2003 Iraq War and the Arab Spring movements, which allowed Iran to expand its influence in the region. Pro-Iranian militias strengthened their positions in Iraq and Syria, creating a corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon and encouraging Iranian interventions in Bahrain in 2011 and Yemen from 2015 onwards(Sofinzon, 2023). The collapse of regimes in Libya and Egypt, the threat posed by terrorist groups like ISIS, and the rise of Islamic Political Activism were seen as significant threats by the Gulf

monarchies. They sought to contain revolutionary movements and perceived Iran's growing influence as a major challenge.

Israel shared these concerns. Throughout the 2010s, under successive right-wing governments led by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel viewed Iran's nuclear ambitions and regional terrorism as its primary security threats. Consequently, Israel aligned with Saudi and Emirati interests in containing Iran's influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah and in Gaza through Palestinian Islamic Jihad. This shared counter-revolutionary stance between Israel and the Gulf monarchies laid the groundwork for the Abraham Accords. However, Israel and the Gulf monarchies have different attitudes in their confidence in being able to handle a military confrontation with Iran. In contrast to Israel, the UAE lacks effective military power and defense capabilities, especially power projection. In addition, the UAE isn't entirely confident in American aid or defense in the case of a military confrontation with Iran. This point is especially salient following the recent attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia. The UAE seemed surprised by the lack of meaningful support and actions from Trump, and the experiences raised a question of U.S. reliability in times of conflict. In contrast, Israel remains confident in American military support (Citrinowicz,2020).

2.1.3- Strategic considerations

The Abraham Accords were concluded during a period of significant regional insecurity due to tensions between the US and Iran. The agreements brought together US regional partners who shared concerns about the destabilizing influence of radical Islamist groups and Iran's regional activities (Vakil and Quilliam, 2023, 3). Concerning the UAE, these formalized relations came after more than a decade of quiet Israeli–Emirati engagement, driven by mutual worries about declining US security commitments in the region, a shared ambition to manage and influence regional conflicts directly, and a desire to strengthen regional economic ties.

For supporters of normalization, the agreements represent a major inflection point in the history of the modern Middle East. Struck in rapid succession over the final months of 2020, the Abraham Accords have the potential to shift the region's strategic trajectory in ways overwhelmingly favorable to U.S.national security. These agreements hold out the prospect of ending the persistent conflict between Israel and a group of pragmatic Arab states, which since the early days of the Cold War has regularly frustrated Washington's ability to establish an effective multinational framework for safeguarding vital U.S. interests in the Middle East (JINSA, 2022).

Even the American sponsored Israel's peace treaties with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994 did little to foster a new U.S.-led Middle- Eastern security order based on expanded defense cooperation between Israel and its Arab peace partners. This was despite all three countries being closely aligned with the United States and American bilateral military assistance being crucial to finalizing both treaties.

The treaties ended the state of war between Israel, Cairo, and Amman that dated back to Israel's founding. However, they focused more on resolving past disputes between governments than on building a future vision of peace. As a

result, both agreements resulted in a "cold peace," which involved formal diplomatic recognition, mutual non-aggression, and limited covert security and intelligence coordination (JINSA,11).

For decades after their signing, neither agreement created favorable conditions for more open and expansive economic, social, and defense cooperation. The Egyptian and Jordanian governments did little to encourage their citizens to engage with Israel or educate them on the benefits of peace. Instead, they often fueled or courted anti-Israel public sentiment when politically convenient, especially regarding the unresolved Palestinian conflict.

In contrast, the Abraham Accords have created a significant new strategic opportunity for Washington. These accords aim to unite several key Middle East partners in a common effort to enhance regional stability, security, and prosperity. This opportunity arises largely from the commitment of these states to build a "warm peace" that goes beyond formal governmental relations to include extensive economic, social, and cultural ties between their populations (JINSA,12). Their vision is expansive and positive, based on mutual interests and lacking the historical animosities toward Israel that are prevalent in much of the rest of the Middle East.

Unlike Israel's immediate neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, no state of war ever existed between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco. Additionally, anti-Israel incitement has historically been far less common in these countries compared to other parts of the Arab world. As a result, informal ties have quietly developed between them and Israel over the years, including cooperation on security, intelligence, trade, cultural, and diplomatic matters. The change in the attitude of many Arab states towards Israel is linked to their departure from the zero-sum approach of making the establishment of bilateral relations with Israel conditional on the simultaneous resolution of the Palestinian issue. The factors that contributed to this shift included the crisis of the Palestinian statehood movement and the growing perception that this conditionality limited the Arab states' room for manoeuvre in the international arena and made them overly dependent on Palestinian politics (Zielińska, 2023).

These regional and global realities first became evident during Barack Obama's second term and have since decisively shaped US policy. The first major shift was the growing strategic competition with China and Russia. These two global-system outliers formed closer ties and, in Russia's case, began to challenge the American-led post-1945 global collective security system militarily. As a result, Washington has had to redirect its geopolitical and military focus away from the Middle East towards East Asia and Europe.

At the same time, a decade-long period of ambitious American geostrategic involvement in the internal affairs of regional states came to an end. This era, marked by actions ranging from regime change to societal transformation, began with the Iraq invasion in 2003 and concluded in 2013 when President Obama decided not to enforce his redline on Syrian chemical weapons. Public opinion surveys at the time indicated that Americans were no longer willing to spend

trillions of dollars and lose thousands of troops for societal goals that yielded little success (Jeffrey, 2023).

Despite this, the last three administrations have acknowledged the continued importance of the Middle East to American and global stability. The region's substantial energy exports and critical transportation routes are essential to the global economy. Furthermore, the potential for terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction originating in the region poses significant concerns for responsible leaders worldwide.

To address this challenge, those administrations reduced American resources dedicated to the region, relying on America's numerous security partners to fill the gap. This "by-with-through" strategy, leveraging local allies, was first effectively used in the campaign to defeat the Islamic State (Jeffrey, 2023). However, as the U.S. appeared to disengage while regional states contended with threats from Iranian expansion and Islamic movements, "moderate" Arab states began to reassess their priorities.

2 .2. United States' Interests from the Arab-Israeli normalization

Every US president from 1967 onward has engaged with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict to various extents. A few of Trump's predecessors, such as Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, devoted intensive efforts to this issue—holding peace conferences and negotiations on a final-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians—but none of them were able to reach a deal (Ravid, 2023,). The success of President Trump during his term seemed unlikely, given his aggressive foreign policy track record. However, understanding the transactional nature of the Abraham Accords clarifies this achievement. The accords, which do not demand major concessions from either side, highlight "non-annexation" as a significant accomplishment while sidelining Palestinian aspirations. It is evident that the agreements focus more on political and economic normalization than on achieving "peace" in terms of ending hostilities. Israel's previous peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan have similarly failed to foster genuine normalization between the peoples.

The normalization of relations between Israel and four additional Arab states marks a significant foreign policy success for the Trump administration. Amid criticism of the administration's COVID-19 response and the approaching elections, this foreign policy victory bolsters Trump's standing (Vakil and Quilliam, 2023). In fact, this is President Trump's first clear diplomatic success, especially since other policies, such as rapprochement with North Korea, have been controversial. The deal also helps address the problematic geostrategic position of the U.S., which has been reducing its overseas military presence. The new Israel-UAE-Bahrain alliance disrupts Iran's "arch of resistance," weakens Turkey's alliances, and strengthens key U.S. allies, ensuring their support for U.S. policies in the future. This deal sustains U.S. influence in the region, enhancing both strategic and economic engagement.

This achievement is also personal for President Trump and his closest family. Both he and Netanyahu have claimed that the UAE deal was the result of a long-term strategy and years of work, led by Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner

(Ravid, 2023). Kushner's prediction that "all other Arab countries will gradually follow the United Arab Emirates in normalizing ties with Israel" was initially met with skepticism but was vindicated when Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan quickly followed the UAE.

The unfolding domino effect allows the administration to demonstrate that the U.S. still retains the ability to mediate and facilitate in one of the world's most intractable conflict regions. This success will be applauded by both Republicans and Democrats, strengthening Trump's foreign policy credentials against Biden. Trump's success resonates with significant parts of the American electorate who care deeply about Israel, particularly his conservative base of Christian Evangelicals (Vakil and Quilliam, 2023). These supporters align with Netanyahu's views on Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and East Jerusalem and have supported Trump's embassy relocation. Although they have favored annexation, a poll shows that 68% supported the UAE-Israel agreement, indicating a shift in preference for whatever benefits Israel. This perspective allowed the administration to frame the Israel-UAE agreement as highly significant for Israel (Norlen and Sinai, 2020).

Additionally, many American Jews, traditionally Democratic voters, particularly those who support Netanyahu's policies or the settler movement, have been pleased with Trump's pro-Israel stance. Although they may not have supported postponing annexation, Jewish Trump voters appreciate the rejection of the land-for-peace formula and the philosophy of the Obama administration's "daylight" between the U.S. and Israel. The deal steers Netanyahu away from annexation temporarily, aligning with long-term U.S. interests.

Furthermore, securing the UAE under the U.S. security umbrella obliges the country to support American policies. Two additional aspects worth discussing are the Iranian nuclear agreement and the U.S. effort to alter the Middle East's power balance. The Trump administration has disrupted the Iranian nuclear deal and faces a potential showdown at the UN over imposing "snap-back" sanctions, a step mandated for Iranian non-compliance. Having the UAE and Israel work together supports U.S. strategic efforts, especially since the UAE has often favored diplomacy over security-focused approaches to Iran.

The U.S. stands to gain economically from these accords. By circumventing the congressional ban on high-technology military sales to the Gulf States, the U.S. defense industry gains a wealthy market for American military equipment, including F-35 fighter jets. This comes as Chinese companies have begun filling orders for military equipment that the U.S. could not fulfill due to the ban. China's dependence on Gulf countries for oil and commerce makes the region a potential flashpoint for renewed great power competition. Although China's interests in the region are primarily economic, geostrategic issues may gain importance as their influence grows (Norlen and Sinai, 2020).

In the same context, the U.S. chamber of commerce confirms that American business will also benefit greatly from this agreement. Israel and the UAE are the U.S.'s two largest trading partners in the Middle East with two-way trade between Israel reaching nearly $50B and $25B with the UAE in 2018. Both countries invest

tens of billions of dollars in the U.S. economy and support jobs across the country and are also global hubs for innovation, with hundreds of the leading American companies in a wide range of sectors having a home base in either country. The Middle East has had the lowest rate of intra-regional trade in the world, with just 5% of exports from Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries going to their regional neighbors. And there is no broad regional framework in the Middle East to foster economic cooperation. For U.S. companies, this has meant disconnected logistics and supply chains, high trade and investment barriers, and lack of consistent regulatory frameworks between countries in the region. (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2020)

2.3- Israel's Interests

Prime Minister Netanyahu proudly claims that his doctrine of "Peace for Peace, and Peace through Strength" has finally yielded results (Norlen& Sinai, 2023). By negotiating bilateral agreements to normalize relations with other states, Israel avoids the pressure to negotiate under threats of violence or commit to preconditioned negotiations with the Palestinians. This agreement represents a significant foreign policy achievement and serves as a welcome distraction for Netanyahu's domestic audience as he faces corruption charges and an impending court case. Politically, by excluding his main rivals and governing coalition partners, Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi, Netanyahu elevates his status ahead of potential national elections. He can claim the deal as his personal success, a difficult pill for his more moderate partners to swallow both in principle and at the ballot box.

The agreement also allowed Netanyahu to avoid the controversial issue of annexing parts of the West Bank, which was ambiguously suggested in the Trump Peace Plan. Netanyahu recognized that annexation could be disastrous for Israel. Despite strong support from his right-wing settler base, annexation does not have unanimous backing among the Israeli electorate. The Israeli security establishment has consistently cautioned against it, the Arab world (including the UAE) has warned of potential fallout, and the Trump administration has refrained from publicly supporting it.

By preserving the territorial status quo in Israel, Netanyahu continued to sideline the Palestinians, reinforcing his view that the Palestinian leadership is an unreliable partner for peace. This approach allowed him to divert attention from the peace process while securing profitable bilateral economic relations with key Gulf states, starting with the UAE and followed by Bahrain. Some analysts argue that this move was a clear message to presidential hopeful Joe Biden (and the election winner later), signaling that Netanyahu is prepared to "do business" with him. Such a message is understandable, given Biden's repeated disagreements with many Trump administration policies in the region, including the withdrawal of support for the Palestinian Authority. It would be in Netanyahu's interest to restore this relationship, considering his public humiliation of Biden in 2010, when Israel announced a plan to build 1600 homes in a disputed area of East Jerusalem during

Biden's visit to Jerusalem, in what was seen as a contemptuous rebuff to American peacemaking efforts (Norlen& Sinai, 2020).

The second part of Netanyahu's foreign policy doctrine focuses on the threat posed by Iran and the role of the U.S. in helping him confront that threat. Trump's confrontational policies towards Iran and the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, were closely coordinated with Israel, much to Netanyahu's satisfaction. After the Democrats win the White House, Netanyahu will have to deal with Biden, who played a central role in the Obama administration's negotiations over the JCPOA and convinced Congress to support it.

Netanyahu's vehement disagreement with the Obama administration's Iran policies was so intense that during a visit to Washington, he avoided the White House and instead presented his case against the nuclear agreement before the House of Representatives.

On the other hand, Netanyahu has successfully positioned Israel's military capabilities at the heart of the Persian Gulf, thus shifting and solidifying the balance of power in Israel's favor. This move has significant implications for Israel in terms of intelligence gathering and early warning systems. Additionally, normalization with the UAE and Bahrain brings Israel closer to Saudi Arabia. While senior Saudi royal Turki al-Faisal has ruled out normalization with Israel before the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, the long-standing defense collaboration between Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iran is not a well-kept secret. Israelis remain hopeful that additional Arab states will follow suit, and reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in 'military and intelligence cooperation,' while Oman has already shown interest in security and trade relations.

Furthermore, the expanding openness of the UAE and other Gulf states to Israeli high-tech defense and security products provides a new market for Israeli goods and services. This could help mitigate the impact of declining un-earmarked U.S. defense aid dollars available for Israeli domestic procurement, which could significantly affect the industry. Speculations even suggest that Israel's Aviation Industries might produce wings for F-35 fighters to be sold to the UAE (Norlen& Sinai). Furthermore, the normalization of relations is likely to boost business further across various sectors, including arms, cybersecurity, command-and-control systems, agricultural products, desalination, and drip irrigation technology.

If Israel's agreements with Jordan and Egypt serve as any indication, Israel may not see an influx of Arab visitors to its beaches and holy sites. However, Israelis are eager travelers, and the prospect of a weekend in Dubai offers a welcome morale boost. Additionally, direct flights to Abu Dhabi and overflight rights granted by Saudi Arabia will provide access to major hubs in the East and Far East, benefiting both Israeli tourists and businessmen and reducing their flight costs (Norlen& Sinai).

2.4- The UAE calculations

Israel-UAE normalization is an anomaly in the midst of Palestine's struggle for independence (Baqi, 80). Being a member of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), UAE is a traditional supporter of Palestinian independence, and together with Arab League members, the UAE linked any recognition of Israel to a just settlement of the Palestinian issue, including the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as a capital.

The features of the development of Emirati-Israeli relations began to appear publicly since the absence of the President of the UAE, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed in 2014 due to his illness and the emergence of his brother, Mohammed bin Zayed, in the political scene of the UAE as the de facto ruler of the UAE, which prompted a change in the form of the relationship between Israel and the Emirates from a secret form to take on an overt character. It included security, military, commercial, economic, and technological fields (Shaban et al, 63).

In fact, the manifestations of Emirati-Israeli normalization began long before the Abraham Treaty, and this was manifested in joint cooperation in many sectors. For example, Dhabi's Committee for Vital Establishments and Facilities, responsible for safety and security, signed a contract valued at $816 million in 2008 with AGT International, a Swiss company owned by Israeli businessman MatiKochavi, for the purchase of surveillance materials for vital infrastructure in the Emirates, namely oil and gas facilities.The very same company provided Abu Dhabi with three drones in an attempt to strengthen the latter's intelligence and security capabilities.It also provided police forces in Abu Dhabi with a central security surveillance system known as Falcon Eye, work beginning officially on the project in July 2016 (ACRPS, 2020).

In August 2018, the UAE acquired advanced cellphone hacking technology from the Israeli NSO Group to monitor its critics both domestically and internationally, as well as individuals deemed adversaries, such as journalists and intellectuals. In January 2020, Amnesty International called on Israel to stop issuing export licenses to NSO Group, citing the use of its products in "vicious" attacks against human rights activists in several countries, including the UAE.

Militarily, the UAE frequently participates in joint exercises with Israel, such as the "Red Flag" exercises, an advanced aerial drill supervised by the U.S. Air Force. In March 2017 and April 2019, the UAE Air Force took part in the Iniohos military exercises in Greece, where Israel was also present.

On the other hand, It is important to point out that personal motivation played some role on the part of Emiratis leaders. UAE Crown prince (and the current president) Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan has a lot to gain from normalization with Isreal. Since his brother's ill health in 2014, he is overseeing the country's fast-paced transformation into one of the economic and military powers in the Middle East, a process that has intensified since the 1990's. Together with securing his own and his family's consolidation of power in a country where more than 80% of the workforce is foreign, MBZ's most pressing concern is to preserve UAE's political and military stability, while continuing to diversify the economy away from oil dependence. UAE thus shares the same threats to its

instability as Israel, including « terrorism », regional insurgencies, and the Iranian threat (Norlan& Sinai).

Traub, Cohen and Kertcher (2022) argue that the UAE's neoliberal foreign policy focused on soft power cooperation played a major role in facilitating the Abraham Accords. Thus, from 2004 to 2009, the UAE's foreign policy balanced neoliberal soft power and neorealist hard power, creating internal tensions. Over time, the UAE emphasized soft power, reducing the importance of its Arab-Muslim alliances. This shift led to secret overtures and increased cooperation with Israel, particularly in technology, setting the stage for normalization.

Between 2010 and 2018, the UAE further prioritized the neoliberal approach, as evidenced by the Vision 2021 plan, despite ongoing conflicts involving its neorealist alliances. During this period, cultural and governmental initiatives with Israel became more visible (Traub et al, 73). In late 2018 and early 2019, the UAE decisively shifted towards a neoliberal strategy, focusing on international cooperation for stability and empowerment rather than military alliances. This shift facilitated the signing of the Abraham Accords.

2.5- The case of Morocco

On December 10, 2020, Morocco announced it would partially normalize relations with Israel through a deal facilitated by the Trump administration. In return for restoring some ties with Tel Aviv, Morocco secured significant security and financial agreements with the United States and gained recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara. Although briefly criticized domestically and internationally, the deal came into focus again after Israeli attacks on Jerusalem and Gaza in May 2021, which led to widespread Moroccan solidarity with Palestinians through protests and social media campaigns. These events highlighted the divide between MENA states that normalized relations with Israel and those that did not, complicating regional unity on this issue. Consequently, Israel and the United States are closely monitoring for any signs of Morocco retracting from the deal.

Morocco aims to balance its growing relationship with Israel while maintaining support for the Palestinian cause. The regime has reaffirmed its unchanged stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, facilitated talks between its leading political party and a Hamas leader, and provided aid to Palestine through direct donations and the Bayt Mal Al-Quds Acharif Agency, which focuses on humanitarian work in Jerusalem.

Morocco's partial normalization with Israel is seen as a quid pro quo for security and financial deals with the United States and recognition of its sovereignty over Western Sahara, which the Biden administration reportedly did not reverse. Morocco agreed to resume partial diplomatic ties, establish direct flights to and from Tel Aviv, open liaison offices in both countries, and cooperate on economic and technological fronts, stopping short of full diplomatic relations. Security deals include a $1 billion arms sale, and $3 billion in U.S. aid for private sector projects in Morocco.

Economically, Morocco could benefit from increased trade and investment with Israel, particularly in technology, water, energy, and agriculture. Partial normalization might also boost tourism, potentially increasing Israeli visitors from 50,000 to 200,000 annually and raising annual trade by $500 million(Abouzzohour, 2021).

The decision to partially normalize ties with Israel was made solely by the Moroccan regime, bypassing the elected government and parliament. Following the announcement, an American-Israeli delegation visited Morocco to formalize the declaration, an event presided over by King Mohammed VI, attended by the foreign minister, a royal adviser, and Prime Minister Saadeddine El Othmani of the Justice and Development Party (PJD). (Abouzzohour, 2021)

The PJD, traditionally opposed to normalization with Israel, expressed its disapproval through statements and actions. Despite Prime Minister El Othmani signing the accord, the party reiterated its firm stance against the Zionist occupation and the crimes committed against Palestinians. Internal party figures displayed varied reactions, with former Prime Minister AbdelilahBenkirane initially supporting the normalization but later reaffirming the party's anti-normalization stance.

Concerning the Moroccan public opinion which is considered historically as a fierce supporter of the palestinian cause, « citizens appear to have clearly understood the trade-off between US recognition of Western Sahara and the country's leaders normalizing relations. Although support for normalization itself is likely low, the resulting benefits – a much stronger legitimation of the country's claim over Western Sahara – made citizens far more likely to favour the agreement compared with the Abraham Accords » (Robbins, 2021).

2.6- Sudan

The timeline of Sudan's contemporary effort to normalize relations with Israel highlights the Sudanese regime's search for new credit sources to address its economic crisis and stabilize the political landscape. On February 3, 2020, Sudan's military ruler, General Abd al-Fattah al-Burhan, met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Uganda. The meeting, kept secret until after it happened, was coordinated by the U.S. and supported by Sudan's regional patrons: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. This step was well-received by the Trump administration, leading to Sudan opening its airspace to Israeli planes.

In May 2020, Sudan agreed to pay $335 million to victims of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings and the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole. Former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Khartoum in August 2020 to accelerate normalization talks. Though he did not secure a deal then, further discussions took place in the UAE in September 2020. Sudan demanded an economic support package, including oil and wheat shipments worth $1.2 billion, a $2 billion immediate grant, and further aid over three years.

On October 22, 2020, a joint U.S.-Israeli delegation met with General al-Burhan in Khartoum, culminating in a declaration by former U.S. President Donald Trump on October 23, 2020, that Sudan would normalize relations with Israel. This was part of the Abraham Accords. On December 14, 2020, the U.S. formally removed Sudan from the state sponsors of terrorism list. The normalization deal was signed on January 7, 2021, in Khartoum by Sudan's Justice Minister Nasr al-Din Abd al-Bari and former U.S. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. The U.S. provided Sudan with a $1 billion bridge loan to clear its World Bank arrears. Shortly after, Israeli Intelligence Minister Eli Cohen visited Khartoum, meeting with military officials.

Initially, there appeared to be a divergence of opinion within Sudan's political elites. The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition, which played a significant role in the popular protests against former President al-Bashir, was disconcerted by al-Burhan's move, viewing it as a violation of the Constitutional Declaration signed in August 2019. However, this divergence was minimal and restricted to estranged coalition members like the Communist Party of Sudan. Most FFC members did not confront the executive government over the issue.

General al-Burhan claimed that Sudan's Umma Party and the Arab Socialist Baath Party were willing to accept normalization if supported by a majority in a transitional legislature. The proponents of normalization argued it was necessary to meet U.S. demands and align with regional patrons like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. They also pointed out that Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO had already normalized relations with Israel.

In terms of public opinion, data from the Arab Opinion Index indicates that only a small proportion of the Sudanese population – some 18% - support the idea of formal recognition of Israel by their government. Nonetheless, this does make Sudan the Arab country with the greatest support for formal recognition of Israel. (A.C.R.P.S, 2016)

Concerning the drivers that made the normalization of relations with Israel a priority for Sudan's post-Bashir regime Essentially, Washington gave Khartoum a clear deal, similar to what had been offered to al-Bashir in 2016. Al-Bashir had turned it down because he feared political backlash. However, Khartoum's new rulers positioning themselves as the antithesis of Bashir in terms of relations with the U.S. and Western powers, were eager to prove their worth. With the economy in dire straits, the transitional government saw access to new loans as their salvation. Under these constraints, Washington effectively dictated policy in Khartoum. The mightiest country on Earth strongarmed one of the poorest, burdened by an external debt of around $59 billion (over 190% of its GDP in 2019) and an inflation rate in the hundreds, into political domestication. (El-Gizouli, 2021)

Within this framework, Sudan's military had its own particular agenda. Israel spends about $22 billion annually on its military, approximately 12% of its total government spending. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the associated social, financial, and cultural apparatus form the single most important institution in Israel – a politico-cultural-economic-military-industrial complex. Separating the

military from the civic in Israel is impossible. This indissolubility of nation and army is arguably the model and envy of militaries in the region, encapsulated in the slogan 'one army, one people.' This form of governance has survived the Cold War, aligned with the U.S. democratization strategy in the Middle East, served its 'war on terror,' and was challenged but not defeated by the Arab Spring. The current order in Sudan is seen as an experiment in rebranding authoritarianism without the need for traditional dictators, forming an alliance between militaries and liberal elites. Sudan's Prime Minister, AbdallaHamdok, refers to this cohabitation as the 'Sudan model of transition.'

Once Sudan joined the Abraham Accords, the U.S. military initiated a cooperation scheme with the Sudanese military reminiscent of the 1970s, when Sudan's army was a key beneficiary of U.S. military strategy in the region, serving as a bulwark against Ethiopia's Derg regime and Libya. Commanders of the U.S. Africa Command spent several days in Khartoum in January 2021 to discuss 'strategy' with their Sudanese counterparts, and U.S. military ships docked in Port Sudan were welcomed by jubilant Sudanese navy officers. This development was described in U.S. military news as a "fundamental change in the bilateral relationship between the United States and Sudan." (El-Gizouli, 2021)

However, in contrast, some scholars emphasize that « the fact that the normalization process started during a transitional period in Sudan is troubling. Momentous leaps in foreign policy should be discussed and approved through democratically elected institutions, which are currently absent in Sudan. Moreover, strategic foreign policies require stable governance conditions that are missing today in both Sudan and Israel. Israel has been going through its own political turmoil since Netanyahu proposed a judicial overhaul in early 2023 » (Zaidan, 2023).

In addition, Sudan is experiencing significant tension due to the conflict between the military and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary group, which began in April 2023. The military insists that the RSF should be fully integrated into the army during the transitional period, while the RSF argues that this integration should happen only after substantial reforms within the military institution. During this power struggle, foreign policy initiatives are likely to benefit individual political actors rather than the nation as a whole. Consequently, such initiatives are expected to exacerbate the rivalry, particularly concerning a sensitive issue like normalizing relations with Israel.

2.7- Bahrain

Bahrain's signing of the Abraham Accords in September 2020, did not come out of the blue or without precursory signs. It happened after years of allowing Israeli economic and sports delegations to visit Bahrain and efforts by the Bahraini authorities to **buy Israeli spyware** to use against political opposition and human rights activists.

Bahrain, like the UAE, hosts US military bases and maintains strong economic, security, and diplomatic ties with the United States, making it challenging for either country to oppose US policies (Saeed, 2024). However, the history of political mobilization in the two nations is quite different.

Bahrain has experienced numerous movements and revolts demanding political change and reform over the decades, whereas the UAE has remained relatively stable, with dissent primarily confined to the country's prisons.

Some commentators symphesize that Bahrain is not in charge of its own rapprochement with Israel (DaziHéni, 2020). While the small kingdom maintains close relations with Israel in security matters, it has always been careful not to upset its own population, which is traditionally the most politicised of the GCC states, along with Kuwait's. The normalisation of its relations with Israel was imposed on Bahrain following the Emirati announcement on 13 August 2020 and under joint pressure from Bin Salman and Trump. President Trump was in a hurry to register a diplomatic success so as to erase from memory the failure of the 'deal of the century', driven by his son-in-law. Bahrain's role in this normalisation is nonetheless central because it serves as a direct political channel between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

However, Bahrain's signing of the Accords did not receive the consent of the public nor the approval of the Council of Representatives. Nor was the agreement signed after a popular referendum. Rather, it came as a unilateral decision by the government – a body that is controlled by the royal family in Bahrain. Not surprisingly, the decision was met with public outrage expressed both on social media and through unauthorized, spontaneous demonstrations across the country (Saeed, 2024).

Conclusion

The Palestinian issue is considered one of the most complex historical issues in the era of colonial conflicts, the events of which we are still living to this day. The historic Balfour Declaration in 1917 to establish a homeland for the Jews on the land of Palestine with the doctrine of the Promised Land was a historical turning point in the Palestinian issue, which came at the expense of Palestinian lands and sanctities. It was the first seed for the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

American foreign diplomacy played, and continues to play, an important role in managing the Arab-Israeli conflict at many historical junctures, perhaps the most important of which is the partition resolution that was later adopted by the UN Security Council, and the result was the outbreak of the Nakba War in 1948. This support was not limited to the diplomatic side only, but extended to Direct and indirect military support in all the wars that the Arabs fought against Israel, in which America always tipped the balance in favour of Israel. Despite the issuance of many UN resolutions in favour of the Palestinian cause, American influence made them a dead letter through the use of the veto at times and procrastination. In its implementation at other times, it was the 1967 war, or the Six-Day War, which broke out between Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967 and ended with Israel's victory and its seizure of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. The American role was clear through military and technical support, and on October 9 1973, US President Richard Nixon ordered the start of Operation Nickel Grass to supply Israel with weapons and compensate for its losses in equipment.

On this basis, the Americans talked about establishing an air bridge to Israel in response to the Soviets supplying the Egyptians and Syrians with weapons. Through this air bridge, which lasted more than 30 days, The United States of America provided Israel with more than 22 thousand tons of military equipment. This equipment included large quantities of tanks, artillery, and missiles. In addition, the Americans relied on C-141 Star lifter and C-5 Galaxy cargo planes to transport weapons to Israel, which contributed to changing the course of the war.

One of Al Jazeera's reports stated that Israel is the largest recipient of American foreign aid since World War II, and according to official American indicators, the total aid provided by the United States to Israel between 1946 and 2023 amounted to about 158.6 billion dollars.

According to data from the US Agency for International Development, the volume of aid is much larger than what was stated in official estimates, as the total US aid committed to Israel in the same period amounted to about 260 billion dollars. Most of the American aid to Israel went to the military sector, as the volume of US military aid to Israel reached between 1946 and 2023, according to official American estimates, about $114.4 billion, in addition to about $9.9 billion for missile defence.

American support for Israel began since its establishment in 1948, when America was the first country to recognize the establishment of the Israeli occupation state. Since that time, political, military and economic support has

continued, and has included joint cooperation in the fields of education, health, energy and scientific research.

American diplomacy sought to whitewash Israeli violations at all levels, through which Israel trampled on all international laws and conventions, and even sought to legalize them under the pretext of self-defence once and combating terrorism many times.

In addition to what was mentioned previously, the American diplomatic role has now extended to seeking to promote normalization with many Arab countries that were previously countries resistant to Israel, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Sudan, and other countries, taking advantage of some political and economic temptations and giving many rewards in favour of these countries. Countries. Despite the small size of some countries, such as the UAE and Bahrain, which are considered a tool for legitimizing normalization on the one hand, and blackmailing other countries by managing some internal conflicts, such as Sudan, taking advantage of its weight and economic capabilities on the other hand. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is the heart of the Arab and Islamic world, remains the most influential country that the United States seeks in every way to push towards normalization with the Zionist entity.

Many analysts believe that the Al-Aqsa flood war turned the tables on all American calculations in the region, struck the accelerating Arab-Israeli normalization process, and eliminated the goal of integrating Israel into the region and isolating the Palestinians, making them vulnerable to a brutal Israeli attack through the process of liquidation and gradual killing, in preparation for deleting the issue. From the political dictionary and Arab awareness.

The ongoing process of brutal revenge is not only Israeli, but is clearly American, because what we see of war crimes and the extermination of entire families is not explained by Israel's desire to defeat Hamas and the Palestinian factions and to defeat only the Palestinian people, whose ability to resist has not been exhausted or weakened, but rather a process Systematic revenge expresses the degree of American frustration and confusion, through which Washington seeks to send a message to the world that America still has the upper hand in the Middle East and to respond to the shock that struck its prestige due to the surprise of the Palestinian Hamas on October 7.

In the end, it can be said that the United States of America has largely succeeded in playing a positive role in advancing normalization, taking advantage of the fragility of the Arab regimes. However, the recent October 7 war revealed all the truths and lies that America boasts about in protecting human rights, freedom, and human values, which collapsed before the eyes of the world through the crimes it committed against the Palestinian people, who spared nothing to defend themselves and their sanctities.

الملخص بالعربية:

لقد لعبت السياسة الأمريكية عبر المحطات المختلفة من الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي دورا هاما في سيرورة الأحداث التاريخية بداية من قرار التقسيم بعد وعد بالفور والانتداب البريطاني في فلسطين وصولا إلى مختلف الحروب والنزاعات المختلفة. ولعل البارز في كل هذه الأحداث هو الحماية التي تتمتع بها إسرائيل من طرف الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، بالرغم من دوسها على كل اللوائح والقوانين الدولية بما فيها مجلس الأمن الدولي، والتي هي في الحقيقة نتيجة التأثير اللوبي الصهيوني في مراكز القرار الأمريكي. حاولنا من خلال هذا البحث أن نشخص الجذور التاريخية للصراع العربي الإسرائيلي عبر مختلف المحطات التاريخية في الفصل الأول، أما في الفصل الثاني فتطرقنا إلى دور السياسة الأمريكية في دفع عجلة التطبيع بمختلف الإغراءات السياسية والاقتصادية، والتي نأخذ فيها بعض الأمثلة التي حاولت إسرائيل ومن ورائها أمريكا إعطاء الشرعية لعملية التطبيع مع بعض الدول التي هي في الحقيقة مجهرية من الناحية الجغرافية كالإمارات والبحرين، إلا أنها تعطي بعض الشرعية لعملية التطبيع بصفة رمزية، وبعض الدول ذات الأهمية الاقتصادية كالسودان ومصر، بالإضافة إلى دول أخرى ذات رمزية دينية كالسعودية والتي تعتبر القلب النابض للعالم الإسلامي، والتي تسعى أمريكا بكل قوى لدفعها الى التطبيع مع إسرائيل. وفي الأخير عرجنا على الأحداث الأخيرة في حرب 7 أكتوبر بما يعرف بطوفان الأقصى والتي مازالت أحداثه تلقي بظلالها لحد الساعة، حيث أخلطت كل الحسابات وبينت مدى الزيف وازدواجية المعايير في هذا العالم من خلال المجازر المرتكبة في قطاع غزة وسياسة التجويع الممنهجة التي تستعملها إسرائيل على مرأى ومسمع العالم مما أدى إلى انهيار ما يعرف بمنظومة القيم والضمير العالمي.

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