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THE QUESTION OF ALIENATION IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY (BETWEEN THE MANIFESTATION OF THE CONCEPT AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF MEANINGS)

Lasgaa Rabia
Dr., Senior Lecturer "A", University of Mohamed Boudiaf, M'sila, Algeria

ABSTRACT

As is well known, Hegel is one of the most famous philosophers who dealt with the problem of alienation in a profound philosophical manner. Therefore, he is considered by many scholars to be the "godfather of alienation," through the ideas and theories he immortalized in important works, the most famous of which are the book "Phenomenology of Thought" (1807) and the book "Philosophy of Right," in which he addressed the phenomenon of alienation based on concepts that confirm his intellectual originality

In the first book, he addressed it within the framework of his analysis of the movement of consciousness, specifically the movement of philosophical consciousness, in which consciousness moves from abstract truth to sensory certainty and from there to the certainty of absolute knowledge. In The Philosophy of Right, however, alienation appears within the framework of Hegel's social philosophy. The fundamental problem we address here relates to Hegel's approach to the subject of alienation. How did he address it, and what meanings and connotations did he attribute to?

Introduction

Alienation is a term with multiple connotations, used in various fields of knowledge that address the diverse forms of the human being's relationship with himself, with God, with the Other, and with society. Thus, it represents alienation from the state in Hegel (1770–1831), alienation from God in Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), alienation from labor in Karl Marx (1818–1883), and alienation from pleasure in Sigmund Freud (1856–1939).

The researcher tackling the question of alienation in Hegel is confronted with an arsenal of Hegelian concepts such as Spirit, the Absolute, consciousness, reason, ego, self, alienation, negation, contradiction, conflict, state, freedom, right, objectification, and many others — all of which must be approached with great caution.

As is well known, Hegel is one of the most prominent philosophers who addressed the problem of alienation in profound philosophical terms. For this reason, many scholars have regarded him as the "godfather of alienation," owing to the ideas and theories he immortalized in his significant works, most notably *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) and *Philosophy of Right*, in which he tackled the phenomenon of alienation starting from concepts that affirm the originality of his thought.

In the first book, he dealt with alienation within the framework of his analysis of the movement of consciousness — specifically, the movement of philosophical consciousness in which consciousness moves from abstract truth to sense-certainty, and from there to the certainty of absolute knowledge. As for *Philosophy of Right*, alienation appears within the context of Hegel's social philosophy.

The central problem we address here concerns Hegel's treatment of the topic of alienation: how did he address it, and what meanings and connotations did he attribute to alienation?

First: Alienation in the Mirrors of Language and Terminology

Defining concepts in scientific research and in writing theses and academic articles is the foundational step upon which any research endeavor rests, in order not to misinterpret them or understand them in connotations other than their intended ones. Many concepts used in the various human and social sciences carry multiple connotations and meanings, which compels the researcher to define his research concepts precisely. The concept of "alienation" is no exception to this rule; rather, it is one of the most difficult of these concepts. Indeed, it is "a concept surrounded by much ambiguity and confusion due to the multiplicity of domains in which it is used" (Ragab, 1988, p. 31).

In the same vein, it should be noted that the term *Alienation* has not yet settled into a stable translation in the Arabic language. Sometimes it is translated as *ightirāb* (alienation), or *'uzla* (isolation), or *ghurba* (estrangement), or *taghrīb* (exoticization), or *istilāb* (dispossession), or *irtihān wa-insilākh* (mortgaging and detachment), or *alienation* (as a borrowed foreign term), or *iftirāq 'an al-jawhar* (separation from essence), or *insilākh* (shedding). These translations may create confusion in the reader's mind and in his understanding of the intended meaning; moreover, they may misapply the term itself. To avoid all these pitfalls, it is necessary to define the concept of alienation from its various aspects beginning with its linguistic dimension, to trace the linguistic and philosophical roots of the concept of "alienation," and then examining its meanings in the social sciences, particularly psychology.

Alienation (*Alienation*) in Language

The terms *ghurba* and *ghuriba 'alayh* mean to leave someone far away; *ghurba* and *ghurāb* refer to departure from the homeland and alienation. *Ightaraba fulān* means he married outside his kinship (Ibn Manẓūr, n.d., p. 278).

Ghurba means estrangement from the homeland; *gharaba fulān 'annā* means he distanced himself; *aghrabtuhu wa-gharabtuhu* mean I caused him to move away. *Ghurba* also denotes distant separation; it is said *shaqqat bihim ghurbat al-nawā*, meaning they endured the hardship of distant separation. *Ightaraba al-qawm* means they set out; *ghāya mughriba* means a goal that is very far away. *Gharīb* refers to obscure speech, and the *ghurāba* of a word denotes its strangeness (Al-Farāhīdī, 1982, pp. 409–412).

The Oxford Dictionary points out that alienation derives from the adjective *alien*, meaning "strange" or "foreign." When the preposition *to* is added, it means "opposed" or "different." The literal translation of *alienation* means "distancing, transformation, or estrangement from society" (Oxford, 1984, p. 18).

The word *alienation* comes from the Latin root *alius*, from which the term *alienus* is derived, which itself means "another place or person." Thus, the meaning of alienation carries both spatial and existential significance (Neni, 2008, p. 75).

The Latin origin of the word *alienation* is *alienatio*, which derives its meaning from the verb *alienare*, meaning to transfer something to the ownership of another person, or to dispossess, or to relinquish. This verb in turn comes from another verb, *alienus*, meaning belonging to or relating to another person, and this latter verb ultimately comes from the term *alius*, which means "the other," whether as a noun or an adjective (Schacht, 1980, p. 63).

B. In Terminology

André Lalande defines alienation in his *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* as "the act of selling or transferring a right to another person; it metaphorically refers to the condition of belonging to another. It carries merely a metaphysical and verbal definition: alienation is the state of no longer possessing oneself" (Lalande, n.d., p. 36).

Lalande here points to the possession of the self by the other, which opens the way to question whether alienation, in this sense, carries an ideological dimension which in principle allows us to say that ideology itself is the undermining of the self by the ideas of the other, meaning its possession through adopting his thought.

In the *Philosophical Encyclopedia*, alienation is defined as the lack of harmony between essence and existence — alienation as deficiency, distortion, and deviation from the proper state (Ziyada, 1986, p. 39).

Ragab (1988, pp. 31–32) defines alienation in two ways:

– First: the words "alienation" or "estrangement" mean displacement from the homeland, distance, and separation from others a meaning that is undoubtedly social, yet inseparable from psychological feelings of fear, anxiety, and nostalgia that either cause, accompany, or result from it.

– Second: although the individual belongs to an environment that defines him and is known through it, this has not prevented the emergence of forms of rebellion or both collective and individual anxiety.

Al-Nouri (1979, p. 13) defines alienation as "detachment and separation from the self, anomie, estrangement from things, discontent, exposure, isolation, and a sense of meaninglessness in life, ultimately leading to frustration."

Kroezbell (1985, p. 264) similarly defines it as a psychosocial state that dominates the individual, making him feel strange and distant from his social reality.

From what has been presented, we conclude that alienation involves distance, separation, and estrangement from others which does not occur without psychological feelings (fear, anxiety, nostalgia) that cause, accompany, or result from it.

Alienation in Psychology

Alienation is a well-known and widespread condition throughout all ages. It falls within the realm of the individual's subjective suffering, as most studies have approached this phenomenon negatively, treating it as though it were pathological, and have not given enough attention to its positive side. Such studies often view alienated individuals as needing help to understand their internal problems and acquire the ability to resolve their inner conflicts, overlooking the fact that alienation is linked to human consciousness and expresses human freedom. It exists as long as humans exist in society and is essentially tied to social consciousness and the influence of the environment (Hafez, 1980, p. 544).

After the Industrial Revolution, which brought significant advances in production techniques and human life, especially as human relationships became more complex, people began to suffer oppression from employers, and their freedom was stripped away, leading them to feel alienated.

The individual thus finds himself powerless in the face of a society dominated by laws and corrupt social judgments that block his aspirations and desires, causing frustration, which drives him toward isolation from himself and others. Psychologists note that this phenomenon arises under specific psychological, social, and economic conditions and has harmful consequences for both the individual and society (Sharouni, 1979, p. 69).

Psychologists have also found that the alienation a person feels reflected in his daily behaviors manifests first as separation from himself, and then from others. Such situations occur when the individual, unable to control himself or adapt to others, feels that achieving his goals requires acting contrary to accepted social and moral norms (Al-Nouri, 1979, p. 41).

However, this does not mean that alienation is always harmful in all its forms and degrees. Moderate alienation, and some particular forms of it, are necessary for social progress, as a certain amount of alienation among individuals is considered natural and even indicative of increased social change. Reformers, innovators, and inventors often feel alienated from the values and norms of their society and call for values and ethics that may differ slightly or greatly from those prevailing in their society, in order to push it toward what the spirit of the age demands (Al-Jubouri, 1996, p. 43).

Freud (1856–1939)

Freud argued that alienation in humans arises from the split between the conscious and the unconscious the latter being the storehouse of primary drives, the seat of life forces, and the arena of primary psychic processes, where the life instincts (*Eros*) conflict with the death instincts (*Thanatos*). Freud posited that the unconscious constitutes a repository of all human disappointments and frustrations in social and psychological life, where all desires and needs that cannot be satisfied in reality are repressed and buried (Freud, 1962, p. 72).

We observe here a constant struggle between instincts and the repression imposed upon them: acceptable thoughts ascend to consciousness and are expressed freely, whereas unacceptable thoughts sink into the unconscious, expressing themselves through strange symbolic behavior, fantasies, and other mechanisms. All these pathways push the individual toward alienation and a flight from the lived reality into an idealized reality that he finds in his own alienation.

For this reason, Freud concluded that alienation is an inherent feature of the self and of human life. The alienation between the ego (*Ich*), the id (*Es*), and the superego (*Über-Ich*) cannot be overcome, nor can instinctual drives ever be fully satisfied and reconciled (Freud, 1980, p. 28). Humanity, by its very nature, is at odds with society, whose task is to suppress instinctual drives by sublimating them i.e., transforming the sexual drive into symbolic goals expressed through cultural and social forms (Brown, 1977, p. 149).

Finally, Freud discovered that alienation arises from the conflict between two opposing desires, where the psyche eventually rules in favor of one and relinquishes the other. Human behavior is thus driven toward specific objectives, and when these objectives are thwarted or denied, the individual collapses under the weight of his conflict with the external world, leading to alienation and withdrawal from his community.

Erich Fromm (1900–1980)

Fromm approached the question of alienation through an anthropological perspective. He viewed man as part of nature, yet at the same time transcending it and rising above it. When man separates from nature, he "finds himself naked and ashamed; he is alone and free, yet powerless and afraid. The newfound freedom seems like a curse. He is freed from the sweet bondage of paradise, yet not free to control himself or realize his individuality" (Fromm, 1972, p. 35).

Fromm's interest in the concept of alienation began in 1941, as evidenced in his work *The Fear of Freedom*, a book he considered part of a realistic study concerned with constructing the personality of modern man and understanding the interaction between psychological and social factors. Fromm pointed out that these social factors reveal levels of estrangement and separation from the self, which according to him presents the individual with a serious social problem (Fromm, 2008, p. 118).

Fromm developed his understanding of alienation from two main sources:

The first source: early theological writings, where alienation refers to two interrelated meanings man's separation from God through his involvement in sins and transgressions, and idolatry. Idolatry here is not limited to objects made by one's own hands but extends to things made by others and even to other human beings themselves. Idolatry can thus be defined as the human being's submission to things in a way that makes him lose himself and his humanity, becoming a slave to them.

The second source: the early writings of Karl Marx, particularly those of the young Marx, which Fromm relied on extensively (Hammad, 2005, pp. 274–275).

Fromm showed that the same mechanisms through which man flees from his freedom are precisely those that lead him to alienation from himself. The most prominent of these mechanisms are (Hammad, 2005, p. 149):

1. Conformity or submission to the crowd.
2. Sadomasochistic submission.
3. Submission to anonymous authority.

Fromm used the term *alienation* to describe a specific state of the human being's relationship to himself, to others, to his work, and to the objects surrounding him. Man has created a world of various systems, yet he has cut himself off from them, no longer feeling part of or in harmony with them. Instead, these systems have become a heavy burden, alienating him due to his lack of emotional and intellectual engagement with them. Consequently, he experiences insecurity, boredom, and chronic anxiety:

"The alienated man does not feel himself to be the center of his world, its creator and master. Rather, his own works have become dominant over him, controlling him, and he must obey them" (Fromm, 1960, p. 27).

We also observe that Fromm's analysis of the problem of overcoming alienation and building a healthy society ultimately leads to a single conclusion: Fromm's implicit faith in exceptional elite. This faith is evident in several of his intellectual positions most notably his acceptance of the idea of the "original self," his rejection of conformity to the crowd, his emphasis on spontaneous connection with the world and others (which can only be achieved by a creative minority), and finally his conviction that the force that will renew society will come from those who have not been absorbed by the prevailing order (Fromm, 2005, p. 260).

Second: Philosophical Approaches to Alienation
The Concept of Alienation Before Hegel

The idea of alienation did not appear explicitly by name in classical times, yet it was nonetheless present in reality. Beginning with the Greek era, through the medieval and modern periods, and up to the Hegelian moment in the history of philosophy, alienation emerged as an imaginative idea. It was Hegel who transformed this idea, giving it its proper epistemic trajectory, and conferring upon it a conceptual, theoretical, and practical character. Regarding its practical aspect, Yvon Quiniou (2006, p. 80) states: *"The alienation of the Idea in nature in Hegel."*

Although alienation, as a phenomenon, began to manifest in antiquity, and although it is considered a modern philosophical term, and it has often been defined within modern and contemporary philosophy, it is necessary to recognize that its historical roots lie in ancient philosophy — roots sufficient to benefit from in the present study. Indeed, one could argue that this idea is as old as philosophy itself, to the point that some scholars affirm the presence of reflections on it even in Socrates himself and in Greek thought more broadly.

The wonder-filled spirit of ancient man was able to produce its arts and varied expressions arts that expressed the spirit of astonishment, magic, the fantastic, the marvelous, the strange, the mysterious, and liberation from the ordinary and the familiar accompanied by philosophical and aesthetic reflection in diverse directions.

Socrates (469–399 BCE) can be seen as a symbol of rebellion against the corruption that had nested within his society. He was by no means satisfied with his reality and sought constantly to change it, which led him to positions at odds with reality and outside the ordinary. In rejecting all of the established certainties of his time, we find him alienated from nature, seeking to replace it with the method of doubting everything in existence. In doing so, he expressed the positive side of alienation, as his awareness of the conflict between his self and his surrounding environment took shape in feelings of non-belonging, indignation, and rebellion against reality with the aim of transforming it. As he said: *"If I cannot speak the truth in my own city, Athens, how could they let me say it elsewhere?"* (Karam, n.d., p. 57). However, Socrates overcame his alienation when he drank the hemlock without hesitation, confronting the opinions and ideas of his society and rebelling against them.

Socrates was among those who rebelled against his reality and constantly sought to change it, which led to accusations against him of holding views that were contrary to reality and strange at the same time. He was alienated from nature by rejecting all of the established certainties and replacing them with skepticism about all existing things (Xyceres, 1987, p. 212).

Plato (427–347 BCE), on the other hand, believed in the world of Forms and their earthly shadows. He thought that man lives alienated because he lives in a world that is not his true home. From his perspective, man has not yet grasped the world of Forms (the Absolute) and is instead living an incomplete earthly life.

Plato insisted that human truth has two faces: one face is complete, radiant truth, while the other is merely a reflection or shadow of this truth. In this view, we live our worldly life deceived by its false appearance (Khaled, 1998, p. 140).

For Plato, the root of alienation lay in man's ignorance of his own essence. Plato's man is alienated from himself, torn between the world of reality and the world of Forms. When the individual gives up certain desires, he achieves a better realization of himself, relinquishing his individuality to achieve sociability, since participation and belonging are founded solely upon common interest and social justice. Furthermore, inequality in wealth and class differentiation based on property is, according to Plato, the cause of alienation and non-belonging (Iskandar, 1988, pp. 11–16).

This clearly indicates that Plato was alienated from the politics and morals of his society, as he envisioned an ideal life centered on goodness, truth, and beauty. His alienation from himself is revealed in his division of the human soul into three competing forces, inevitably leading to conflict and disharmony between body and instincts. Plato considered the soul buried in the body, life as a long exile, and salvation to be found only in death. As Shaftesbury (1980, p. 22) put it: *"To become oneself means to become a stranger."* Thus, Plato remained alienated though not like his teacher Socrates through his belief in the existence of another world beyond the one he inhabited. This belief was itself a sign of alienation from the world, from society, and from the human self.

Often, alienation has been treated as the subject of imaginative narratives in the history of philosophy as conceptual alienation (*alienation imaginaire*), such as the alienation of the slave in Plato's cave (428–347 BCE), or the loss of original moral perfection in Christianity due to original sin. This is what led the French reformer John Calvin (1509–1564) to speak of the estrangement between God and man a theme that drove the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century to focus on criticizing this estrangement and separation between man and God, which, according to Calvin, constituted spiritual death (Faleh, 2012, p. 10).

The critique of alienation as a religious idea began with Protestant Christianity (specifically Calvinism) from the perspective of combating the mediation between God and man. Man, they argued, could only free himself from spiritual alienation by ridding himself of the burden of mediation. Only then could he reach the desired salvation.

Among the Protestants, the concept of alienation emerged in a completely different social and ideological context, which emphasized the safeguarding of individual rights, freedom, and property as a citizen in a contractual relationship with the state. This gave rise to a new linguistic and political treatment of the term alienation.

Pioneers of the Social Contract Theory and the Problem of Alienation
The idea of renouncing, relinquishing, separating from individual rights, and transferring them into an external social existence (*alienation*, in the sense of Thomas Hobbes, 1588–1679) did not appear explicitly under the term *alienation*. Hobbes did not use the term directly to describe the relinquishing, surrendering, separating from, or transferring of rights to another to the government (the sovereign) but rather employed other expressions, such as *divest*, *renounce*, meaning to abandon or relinquish, or *transfer the right*.

This idea of relinquishing, surrendering, separating, and transferring rights persisted with John Locke (1632–1704). Man, in the state of nature, enjoys freedom and the right to property, and he is not separated from these rights until the emergence of the state that is, with the advent of the civil (political) condition.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), in his treatise *Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men*, defined the social contract as an inherently unstable structure. Since the human will can choose at any moment, there is always the possibility of violating the social contract whether by the ruler or by the governed. Hence arises the possibility of the loss of freedom, alienated voluntarily in exchange for security, or alienated forcibly (as in enslavement) with the rise of despotism.

We can discern from the outset the importance of alienation in Rousseau's thought from several aspects: his concern with the unity of man, representing his original nature, versus the separation that appears in modern society in the form of alienation; his concern with individuality, uniqueness, and creativity, versus the modern tendency of society to impose models and enforce conformity (Kontio, 2012, p. 37).

Rousseau's writings contain the first and clearest declaration of the problem of man in bourgeois society, which he identified as the loss of man's unity. In his view, the modern bourgeois is neither a citizen, as he was in the ancient city, nor a complete human being, as he was in the state of nature, but rather a divided creature.

Thus, we see that alienation in Rousseau's thought is both a human alienation whereby man loses his original nature and uniqueness and a social alienation since it is rooted in the specific conditions of modern society.

Rousseau rejected alienation understood as surrender and relinquishment in the sense of selling oneself. He argued that a man who sells himself regards himself as if he were an object or commodity with a market price. He considered this a negative phenomenon yet one characteristic of the modern age because human relations, both at the level of states and individuals, are subject to the logic of interest and utility in a world where human interdependence increases to meet collective needs (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017, p. 2).

Third: The Question of Alienation in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)

Hegel addressed the concept of alienation in his two books: *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and *Philosophy of Right*. In the first book, he dealt with it within the framework of his analysis of the movement of consciousness specifically, the movement of philosophical consciousness, in which consciousness moves from abstract truth to sense-certainty, and from there to the certainty of absolute knowledge (Rae, 2012, pp. 24–25). In *Philosophy of Right*, alienation appears within the context of Hegel's social philosophy.

We notice that one group of scholars emphasizes the role of the concept of alienation in Hegel's account of the development of consciousness, while another group stresses the prominence of alienation in Hegel's social philosophy. The latter argues that Hegel's notion of social alienation influenced both Feuerbach and Marx.

This raises the central question: what is the concept of alienation for Hegel, and what are its connotations and meanings?

The Concept of Alienation in Hegel

Schacht (1980, p. 96) notes that Hegel used the term *alienation* in a dual, even contradictory, sense. The first sense is associated with separation and is used to refer to a relationship of estrangement or dissonance such as that which may arise between the individual and the social structure, or as a self-alienation that arises between a person's actual condition and his essential nature.

The second sense refers to a conscious surrender and sacrifice of particularity it involves a deliberate renunciation or submission aimed at achieving a desired goal: unity with the social structure. Alienation in the first sense is thus overcome by alienation in the second sense.

1. Linguistic Connotations

Just as in English, the German term for alienation was in use since the middle Ages. According to Grimm, it is similar to *fremd*, meaning disordered perception, nausea, or bewilderment. The German *Grimm*, English *alien*, and Latin *alienus* converge in their etymological roots.

The German term originally referred to things alienated in the literal sense, and it has come to be used in relation to any kind of estrangement. Thus, the literal sense of the second term for alienation corresponds to what the English term *Entfremdung* denotes. Schacht (1980) points out that the German term *alienation* has applications similar to those of the English term, particularly regarding property relations.

Although the equivalence is not perfect in legal contexts, it appears in situations involving seizure, expropriation, or dispossession hence, in German sources, the alienated thing is something that belongs to

another. This reveals the similarity between the German and English terms, as the German dictionary also refers to the transfer of something belonging to one person to another.

Additionally, the German term has been used to refer to alienation in the sense of mental disorder — which suggests a loss of awareness or disruption of perception as indicated by examples mentioned by Grimm. It was also used with the same meaning as in English when referring to inner, personal alienation.

Hegel himself used the German term *Entfremdung* in his *Phenomenology of Spirit*, demonstrating from the outset his concern with establishing a real unity between individuals each possessing self-consciousness and between the individual and society, in order to transcend the contradictions arising between them.

This term from Hegel's writings served as the basis for two terms later employed by Marx (borrowed from Hegel): the first is *Entäußerung*, and the second is *Entfremdung*. The first term refers to the external aspects of the self, particularly as a result of selling one's labor, and the second term refers to estrangement or the self's separation from itself — the latter closely tied to *reification*, where the individual is treated as an object, losing his unity in the process.

2. The Philosophical Significance of Alienation in Hegel

Hegel defined alienation as follows:

"It is the condition of powerlessness experienced by man when he loses control over his creations, products, and possessions, which are then employed for the benefit of others rather than being governed by him and used for his own ends. In this way, the individual loses the ability to determine his destiny and influence the course of historical events even those that concern him and contribute to his self-realization and ambitions." (Barakat, 2006)

According to Hegel, alienation arises when the gap between the individual and the institutions and the world around him widens. This condition is overcome when a true society emerges in which all private and public interests are integrated a condition that can only be realized through the establishment of a strong central state under which society can control its destiny.

Hegel considered alienation to mean the separation of the human self as a spiritual being from its existence as a social being. He also described it, in another formulation, as the individual's relinquishment of his independence and his unification with the social essence.

Hegel stated:

"Reason finds itself at war with itself and with its creations. In order for reason to achieve its highest self-realization, it must ultimately overcome its own impotence by overcoming the obstacles that separate it from its creations and limit its control."

3. The Connotations and Meanings of Alienation in Hegel

It has become clear that with the German philosopher Hegel, alienation became a philosophical term central to philosophy itself and evolved into a complex philosophical problem comprising economic, social, and intellectual dimensions that reflect directly on lived reality and on human life.

Given the prominence of alienation in Hegel's philosophy which viewed man as either alienated from himself or alienated from his society he saw man, through his development, moving from social alienation to self-alienation by necessity. Since the creator of the world, according to Hegel, is the Absolute Spirit, the world is externalized from it that is, from Spirit and this externalization is, in some sense, the very act of alienation that must be overcome, so that everything may return to the Absolute Spirit to the origin from which it was estranged. This necessitates striving to overcome alienation, as it is the condition of powerlessness that man suffers when he loses his ability to determine his own destiny, and his capacities and possibilities are employed for the benefit of others.

Hegel used the concept of alienation in a dual sense: a positive sense, in which the self is productive, and the spirit creative; and a negative sense, in which the self becomes estranged from itself and from its world. Let us now trace the different meanings and connotations that Hegel attributed to alienation, among them:

a. Alienation as Separation

Starting from the negative view of alienation, Hegel used the term to denote a relationship of separation or estrangement, such as that which may arise between the individual and the social structure, or as self-alienation resulting from the gap between one's actual condition and one's essential nature (Schacht, 1980, p. 96).

This sense of alienation encompasses two aspects of self-alienation:

– In the first, conflicts, contradictions, or divisions arise between the individual and the social structure, making the relationship one of estrangement and antagonism rather than harmony, reconciliation, or

integration with the existing social order. This leads — directly or indirectly   to the individual retreating into himself, distancing himself from the social environment with which he should be, or once was, united. The individual may even come to see the social structure as something entirely alien and opposed to him, making him alienated not only from society but from himself as well — not merely due to the loss or absence of some element of his essential nature, nor solely because of the discrepancy between his current reality and his essence, but because of the loss of the entire social structure and its integration (Jassim, 1978, p. 143).

With such a loss, the individual no longer has the ability to return to the essence of his being, nor is he conscious of the true nature of his existence. Both those who adopt a purely religious outlook and those who see themselves exclusively in their own particularity are alienated from themselves, because in both cases their relationship with the social structure is not one of unity (Schacht, 1980, p. 101).

From the positive sense, however, Hegel observed that alienation from the self can also mean that the social structure is not merely created by reason but also embodies it. The social structure thus becomes reason in objectified form. Hence, when the social structure appears alien to the individual, it is in fact reason objectified his own reason estranged from him. This estrangement arises from the way human social existence is constituted and from its connection to the social structure, so that the individual's relationship to himself occurs through things that should only serve as tools. Because his relationship with himself is mediated by something else, Hegel sees this as a moment of negation which he experiences at all levels, whether as an individual, as part of civil society, as an institution, or as a state.

For Hegel, the state is the totality through which the individual attains free rational existence and moral worth:

"It must be understood that all the value which man possesses, all the spiritual reality he enjoys, and he owes to the state; for his spiritual reality consists only in that his particular essence which is reason is objectively present to him in the state." (Hegel, 1983, p. 111)

This necessarily reveals that when the social structure appears alien to the individual, it is in fact his own objectified self that is alienated from him. Nevertheless, the individual comes to recognize that the social structure, which appears alien, is not truly so it is his own creation, his own objectified self. In losing his original self, and consequently losing his sense of direction and his moral, social, and even personal standards, the individual and society are necessarily driven to work to overcome this alienation.

"The strength of the individual consists in making himself consonant with the structure — that is, in renouncing himself and thereby affirming himself as the structure itself as it exists objectively." (Abbas, 2008, p. 160)

b. Alienation as Surrender (Renunciation)

Hegel agrees with the philosophers of the social contract in attributing a positive and active sense to alienation as surrender, renunciation, or relinquishment. For the social contract philosophers, the renunciation of rights formed the basis upon which civil society and the political entity the state were established. Thanks to this contract, which entails surrender and relinquishment, man moved from the natural state to the political or civil state (Mujahid, 1985, p. 54). In obeying the law, one obeys nothing other than one's own essential and true self.

This renunciation constitutes the effective cause and the principal principle that elevates both the individual and society, the individual self and the collective totality. Both alienate and advance: that is, the self becomes a historical self, capable of building itself, society, the world, and civilization.

Hegel used the term alienation in the sense of surrender to indicate the conscious renunciation of particularity and will, in order to overcome alienation and restore unity (Schacht, 1980, p. 96). Here, separation aims at overcoming self-alienation from the social structure, orienting and working toward the restoration of unity between the individual and the social structure, which for one reason or another had become estranged and stood opposed to him.

"[It entails] relinquishing the concept of oneself as essentially and fundamentally an independent, private existence that clings to its particularity and asserts it at the expense of the whole, viewing the social structure as something alien, in favor of another equilibrium that is both total and particular" (Schacht, 1980, p. 109).

In essence, renunciation or surrender here is in favor of a new equilibrium, in which the particularity of the individual and the totality of the collective are both realized that is, in his individual and social being. Through this, his individuality is affirmed and united with the requirements of the totality that is, the state and does not conflict or clash with it. In such surrender, the individual ceases to see the totality as his opponent or as the source of his alienation and suffering. He also ceases to view this surrender as a negation of the self but rather as its affirmation — as the correct path that achieves the full unity of the individual self with the social totality.

"In this way, the gap that separated him from the social structure disappears, and he overcomes his alienation, achieving his desired totality, thereby realizing meaning and reality. His unity with the social structure is thus restored on a sound basis, since his previous, immediate unity with it was not a true unity, but

rather one born of unreflective harmony. His true unity with it is confirmed only   when, through his self-consciousness, he makes its content his own and shapes himself in accordance with it" (Schacht, 1980, p. 110).

This affirmation of the totality and the correct understanding of man as an independent individual with particularity within the general totality can only be achieved through reason. Reason transcends particularity and involves the movement of thought on the universal level — which is why Hegel attached great importance to universality and generality as the essence of human consciousness and the foundation of human existence (Al-Nouri, 1979, p. 20

c. Alienation as Objectification

Building on the positive meaning of alienation, Hegel gives it a further positive aspect, identifying it with *objectification*. Although this does not appear explicitly in the definition itself, Hegel states:

"The creation of the social structure can be logically regarded as the objectification of human reason that is, as a process by which human reason endows itself with a range of objective rational forms" (Schacht, 1980, p. 114).

Under this perspective, Hegel shows how the free individual self, or subjective spirit, objectifies itself. Its fullest realization is attained in free reason and reaches its highest development at the level of subjective spirit. It then objectifies itself by founding a family thereby achieving an important stage of its existence and subsequently seeks its opposite to achieve itself through the state in a later stage.

Thus, the self moves from the level of subjective spirit at the individual level to objective spirit as embodied in institutions: rights, laws, the family, civil society, and the state at the collective level. Ultimately, spirit attains its fullest realization, because:

"The state, for him, is the complete objective realization of both subjectivity and objectivity together" (Hegel, 1983, p. 111).

In and through the state, the self attains moral value and the essence of free individual existence, revealing that the social structure was indeed created at the stage of the moral world. This production or realization does not instill in the individual a sense that this structure is alien to him; instead, he remains fully identified with it. Only when he ceases to be at one with it does it appear as something alien as an objective world that has lost all sense of estrangement from the self, just as it has lost all sense of possessing an independent existence separate from the world (Schacht, 1980, pp. 114–115).

d. Alienation in Its General Meanings According to Hegel

We can say that alienation in Hegel is alienation of spirit which, upon reaching the Absolute Idea, attains the highest degree of its ascent in logic, only to alienate itself again in nature. Here the Absolute Idea (the concrete whole, the ultimate truth) moves from the realm of pure thought i.e., logic into the realm of nature (Seites, 1982, p. 229).

It alienates itself into nature the external world as the negation in the Hegelian triad composed of the logical idea, nature, and spirit. This paves the way for the three great stages of its progression through nature: the divine world, the natural world, and the organic world. Spirit then returns to itself at the highest stage of its development in nature specifically in the living, sentient, and rational being:

"In the animal, this return the return to subjectivity becomes explicit in the form of consciousness or feeling, and in man this subjectivity becomes 'I,' free. Hence, the living animal is the final form of nature and constitutes the transition to the realm of spirit" (Seites, 1982, p. 319).

Spirit reaches its fullest realization in the Absolute Spirit, where it comes to consciousness of itself within the Hegelian triad (subjective spirit, objective spirit, absolute spirit). First, it finds itself in art, where the spiritual content the Absolute shines through the external sensory world.

The spiritual content can take different forms, depending on the conception of the Absolute in a given era or among a particular people. It may take the form of fundamental religious concepts, or any general spiritual idea, or even the activity of those universal forces that seize the hearts of human beings whether as thought or idea.

At a higher stage, spirit finds itself in religion:

"Here, spirit perceives itself as result and opposes itself within itself progressing from awareness to self-awareness, from natural religion to aesthetic religion to the absolute Christian religion" (Abbas, 2008, p. 160).

At this point, human individuality and self-consciousness are transformed into collective religious consciousness. Alienation becomes the creative activity of spirit, embodying its idea outside itself in an object the outcome of self-externalization. This dual movement was expressed in the appearance of Christ in history, bearing the duality of God and man: a divine essence that became self-conscious as God, and a sensory, visible aspect united with matter as man   confirming:

"Man, too, was able to elevate himself in the person of Christ to the level of essence, thereby transcending himself as a purely finite being" (Abbas, 2008, p. 164).

Nevertheless, human individuality and self-consciousness became collective religious consciousness, revealing according to Hegel that belonging to the whole is itself a form of overcoming alienation. Alienation here is for the sake of integration and separation from the self (sacrifice) in order to unite with the totality. Thus, the individual, for whom the structure appears alien, can overcome this alienation and his alienation from himself i.e., his separation from his essential self only through relinquishing or surrendering his particular self (Jassim, 1978, p. 11).

This finds its fulfillment in Absolute Spirit, or it must proceed from spirit as the agent that achieves the balance between individuality and universality, between self and object a crucial stage in its awareness of its own existence, after which there is no longer a difference between self and object.

Thus, Christianity, according to Hegel, abolished alienation:

"It declared that there is no longer any contradiction between essence and the individual self, and that the unity of being and essence which is at once immediate existence is represented both as direct knowledge in religious awareness and as mediated knowledge in thought" (Al-Nouri, 1979, p. 19).

This does not mean, however, that religion, for Hegel, fully overcomes alienation. Rather, the return of spirit to its absolute, free self does not occur except in philosophy as the actual realization of spirit. Only in philosophy does spirit truly overcome its alienation, become conscious of itself, overcome its estrangement, build its world, and reconcile the interests of the individual self with the collective:

"The task of philosophy is to conceive what is. For what is, is reason… This is a fundamental idea of its function, which does not construct an imaginary world or weave illusions remote from the reality of life, but expresses this very life itself in an intellectual form. Or rather, it liberates the basic ideas upon which practical life rests, revealing the rational frameworks upon which people base their conduct without being aware of it" (Hegel, 1983, p. 88).

In this way, philosophy achieves reconciliation with the actual world and recognizes both the identity of self and object in their very distinction. Self and object merge into a single process and ascend to the level of self-consciousness as spirit through the equation of loss and rediscovery:

"So long as spirit has not reached the self-awareness that sees its own nature in rational existence, it must look upon itself as a strange fact, as if it were merely a representation. It shows that the self becomes itself only after losing itself in the depths of nature and then finding its way back to itself through the philosophy of spirit in its three great stages: subjective spirit, objective spirit, and absolute spirit. This means that to know ourselves we must lose ourselves, and man must die to find himself again" (Abbas, 2008, p. 175).

This allows us to say that alienation here takes on a social character through the equation $I = We$. In this way, individual consciousness becomes universal consciousness, encompassing all existence as spirit, making history the history of spirit itself:

"Through actual history, spirit elevates itself to the level of self-awareness as spirit, becoming itself only after losing itself and finding its way back" (Abbas, 2008, p. 175).

Throughout history, spirit struggles to realize itself, to become absolutely self-conscious, to possess its freedom, and to return to itself for freedom is the essence of spirit and the goal of the total progress of history.

Conclusions

In conclusion, we can affirm that Hegel was the first to employ the term *alienation* in his writings in a systematic and detailed manner. He established the notion of alienation upon the opposition between self and world, and he sought ways to overcome this alienation finding no solution except at the level of consciousness, where things become part of the development of free self-consciousness and serve as a mirror in which consciousness reads its own movement toward full realization.

Alienation for Hegel manifests either as man's estrangement from himself that is, the individual alienated from his own self or as the estrangement of the social structure. This latter form of estrangement depends on the nature of man's relationship to the social structure, whether it be the state or society, and it is resolved through the individual's separation from himself in order to achieve integration.

We can also say that Hegel used the term *alienation* in two distinct senses. In the first sense, he spoke of the individual as alienated from himself here, alienation of the self means that the self becomes confined to its private, particular self and withdraws from the social structure. In the other form of alienation of the self, the social structure itself is reason in objectified form; thus, when the social structure appears alien to the individual, it becomes an objectified reason estranged from him.

The second sense is surrender or sacrifice, which becomes necessary if certain forms of separation are to be overcome this is what is known as *renunciation*.

Finally, we can say that Hegel was the one who discovered alienation as a concept. However, the contemporary philosophy that came after him revolted against his doctrine, which led to the emergence of a one-sided view of the concept of alienation. Whereas Hegel had given the concept a dual meaning   both positive and negative   the focus shifted almost exclusively to the negative side, to the point that the positive meaning was nearly obscured. Today, we read in the concept of alienation mainly the negative manifestations that threaten human existence and freedom.

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